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Abstract
Essays in this dissertation cover three topics in behavioral economics: social preferences,
ambiguity aversion and self-control.
The ﬁrst essay, based on work with Aurelie Ouss, studies the behavior of individuals
making decisions to punish norm violators. It addresses two types of questions. First,
what parameters affect these punishment decisions? Second, what do outcomes look like
when these decisions are aggregated? Experimental data show that individual punishment
decisions appear to respond to individual cost and not necessarily social cost. Addition-
ally, individuals appear not to take the probability that violators will be apprehended into
account. Finally, punishment by others does not act as a perfect substitute for own punish-
ment. These combined effects mean that aggregate levels of punishment rarely resemble
those in line with commonly used benchmarks such as optimal deterrence.
The second essay, based on work with Uma Karmarkar, studies how information affects
valuation of ambiguous ﬁnancial prospects. Experimental results show that across several
domains individual valuations appear to react much more strongly to favorable information
than unfavorable information. Additional studies indicate that this effect is driven by two
mechanisms. The ﬁrst is a bias towards the integration of favorable information. The
second is an effect of ambiguity aversion, individuals appear to be averse to subjective
ignorance and so unfavorable information has a positive component: it removes some of
this uncertainty.
The ﬁnal essay looks at how dual-self (Fudenberg-Levine (2006)) decision makers can
use commitment contracts to combat self-control problems and implement long-run opti-
mal behavior. The main results show that both stick contracts, which levy a ﬁne when an
individual gives in to a temptation, and carrot contracts, which give rewards for resisting,
can simulate binding commitments. However, carrots have several advantages over sticks.
Sticks create a temptation to cancel the contract, carrots are less vulnerable to trembles and
ﬁnally carrots allow for more ﬂexibility.
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Introduction
“The great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie - deliberate, contrived,
and dishonest - but the myth - persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic.”
John F. Kennedy
When I was an undergraduate in university, I had a good friend with whom I would
cook dinners occasionally. It was college level cooking, so it generally took the form of
pasta and tomato sauce. One time when we were preparing one of these dinners, my friend
went to pour hot water from the tap into the pasta pot. I asked what he was doing and told
him that he should use cold water instead because it would boil faster than the hot water.
He didn’t believe me at ﬁrst but after I explained that this was because molecules in the cold
water were generally closer together and thus could more readily transmit energy to each
other, he agreed. He changed his action due to a seemingly plausible theory (which also
happened to contradict all laws of thermodynamics). I must have thought that the incident
was funny but I forgot about it afterwards.
Five years later, when I was in graduate school and he was about to ﬁnish his J.D. and
start a law job in New York we met for drinks. He asked me if I remembered what I told
him about cold water and pasta; apparently, he’d spent the last 5 years of pasta making
following my advice and only recently found out that my theory was, in fact, complete
nonsense. I add that this only happened because he tried explain the method to another
friend, at the time employed as a chef.
I don’t think this story is a result of any lack of intelligence on the part of my friend or
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any idiosyncratic defects in his way of thinking. Rather, I think that there are a great deal of
theories which guide our daily behaviors the assumptions of which we take for granted as
true and the conclusions and prescriptions of which we view as a guide for our decisions.
The intellectually easy shortcut of looking at our favored theories as complete pictures of
the world, rather than at best hastily sketched maps, unfortunately often substitutes for a
more nuanced way of thinking and often leads to colossal mistakes. It would be nice to
think that scientists are safe from this bias, but that appears not to be the case. Indeed,
a large source of impasse in the social sciences has historically been the proliferation of
strongly held theories without correspondingly strong empirical evidence of their relevance
to the world. Luckily, in economics, this is beginning to change.
One trend facilitating this change is the free exchange of ideas between academic ﬁelds,
for example the blending of insights from economics, psychology, biology and neuro-
science. My own work ﬁts into this category and my general interest is in taking psychol-
ogy’s ability to pry into individual behavior and integrating it into economics to understand
how individual behaviors turn into aggregate outcomes. There are many methodological
debates about the relevance of psychological and neuroscientiﬁc variables to economists.
I leave these debates, as well as those about what constitutes ‘real economics,’ to others
and instead offer the following collection of essays as empirical evidence to the value of
combining methodologies, insights and ideas from different ﬁelds. I hope the reader agrees.
The ﬁrst essay, based on work with Aurelie Ouss, deals with punishment decisions
made by individuals, such as those implicitly made when individuals vote for legislators
who set laws, judges who enforce them or serve on juries to render verdicts and sentences.
We consider the simple case of an individual who has a choice to sanction another individ-
ual who has just committed a norm violation. We ask two sets of questions. First, what
parameters of the decision problem affect this individuals decision? Second, if we consider
particular social benchmarks as target outcomes (eg. those given by optimal deterrence),
will the aggregation of many individuals behaviors reach, undershoot or overshoot these
benchmarks? The essay includes both a simple economic model of this behavior and ex-
perimental explorations of its implications. We ﬁnd that punisher behavior cares more
about private costs than social costs, ignores probability of capture and does not seem to be
crowded out by other punishers. Thus, we argue, that hopes of reaching levels of punish-Chapter 1: Introduction 3
ment consistent optimally deterrence in institutions driven by individual decision-makers
are slim.
The second essay, based on work with Uma Karmarkar, discusses how individuals form
evaluations of ﬁnancial prospects when they only have partial information about the proba-
bilities of different outcomes, i.e. ambiguity. We ﬁnd that favorable information appears to
affect individual decisions much more than unfavorable information, contrary to a standard
Bayesian explanation. Additionally, we ﬁnd that two psychological mechanisms appear to
drive this behavioral asymmetry. First, there is a general tendency for individuals to over-
weight positive information in their decisions, an effect that looks quite similar to what has
been called conﬁrmation bias in the psychology literature. Second, we ﬁnd that a general
aversion to subjective uncertainty is at play - two factors appear to play a role in individual
evaluations of ambiguous gambles: individuals care both about their reported estimate of a
favorable outcome but also in how certain they feel about the estimate. In this case, favor-
able information has two positive components: it increases estimates of favorable outcomes
and increases certainty. However, unfavorable information has one negative component
(decreasing estimates) but also one positive one (increasing certainty). This asymmetry in
effects then creates a behavioral asymmetry in evaluations. Since most situations include
an element of ambiguity, I hope that this work becomes a part of a solid empirical bedrock
upon which to build better, simpler and more useful theories of decision-making in the
presence of partial ambiguity.
The topic of the ﬁnal essay is commitment and self-control. We often do things that we
know we shouldn’t: we plan to work, but we procrastinate, we plan to start eating healthy,
but only after today’s desserts and we plan to start spending more responsible, but ﬁrst, we
buy a new useless gadget. For economists, this behavior is puzzling because it suggests
a fundamental departure from a rational, time consistent agent. For the rest of us, this
behavior is normal but begs an important question: what can we do about it? My ﬁnal es-
say applies an economic model of self-control to the second question. The model consider
self-control as a conﬂict between a short-run self who tries to maximize a discounted utility
function and a long-run self who discounts at a slower rate but must use a costly resource,
self-control, to impose his preferences on decisions. I ask whether particular kinds of eco-
nomic contracts can help individuals facing temptation. I look at stick contracts, whichChapter 1: Introduction 4
allow an individual to set a ﬁne for themselves in the case of future bad behavior and car-
rot contracts which allow individuals to borrow future consumption to reward their good
behavior. I show that both types of contracts can be helpful for individuals facing tempta-
tion problems but that carrot contracts have several important advantages to stick contracts.
Most existing research in the psychology and behavioral economics of self-control has fo-
cused on stick contracts and binding commitments but this ﬁnal essay indicates that the
realm of carrots deserves a look.
Real behaviors, are necessarily much more complicated than the models and experi-
ments these essays contain but I hope that their simplicity is a virtue. Good models and
good experiments alike strip out the irrelevant complexities of a problem and focus on the
important moving parts. Whether my essays are successful in doing so and in addressing
important questions remains an empirical question for the reader.Chapter 2
Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions
“[The] Eighth Amendment is our insulation from our baser selves [when] a cry
is heard that morality requires vengeance to evidence society’s abhorrence of
the act.” - Thurgood Marshall
2.1 Brief Summary
When will the aggregation of individual punishing behaviors lead to outcomes in line
with those resulting from instrumental uses of sanctions? We present a model where in-
dividuals derive private utility from punishing norm-breakers (“cold glow”), and compare
their choices to those made if penalties are only viewed as a means for social cooperation.
Our theory predicts that cold glow punishers take into account their private share of the
cost, care about their own contribution to overall punishment, and underweight the role
of probability of capture. Instrumental punishers seeking optimal deterrence care about
social costs and beneﬁts of punishments, probability of apprehension, and total levels of
punishment. This means that that different environments can predictably result in either
over-punishment or under-punishment relative to the benchmark of optimal deterrence. We
conﬁrm this in a series of experiments.
5Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 6
2.2 Introduction
Do individuals choosing punishments act in ways that are compatible with optimal
levels of punishment to achieve social cooperation at minimal cost? If individuals derive
private beneﬁts from punishing norm-breakers, they will respond to different parameters
than punishers only interested in maximizing material social welfare (optimal deterrence),
and aggregate outcomes might differ radically. We build a theory of punishment decisions
built on psychologically defensible assumptions, use it to focus on a set of parameters to
consider, and test responses to variations in these parameters in a series of experiments.
There are many reasons for devoting resources towards sanctioning law breakers. For
example, deterrence theory posits that higher potential punishments reduce law-breaking
in a society, thus helping to maintain social cooperation. On the other hand, retributive
theories see punishment as an end in itself. Motives such as deterrence could also be called
‘public goods’ motives of punishment, where the public good is increased social payoffs
from increased cooperation; while motives such as retribution could also be called ‘pri-
vate goods’ motives, since individuals receive personal utility from the punishment itself.
Our main intuition is simple: if individuals view punishment more like a private good,
then aggregations of individual decisions may not lead to outcomes in line with optimal
punishments with a benchmark such as optimal deterrence in mind.1
We ﬁrst formalize our intuition of punishment as a private good using a simple model.
Our model builds strong reciprocity (see Gintis et al. (2005) for a survey) into a utility
function. When an individual commits a socially praise-worthy act, that individual’s pay-
off positively enters into the utility of others: they gain private beneﬁts from increasing his
welfare. Conversely, when an individual commits a norm violation, the utility of the norm
violator negatively enters the utility of other individuals: individuals gain private beneﬁts
when a norm-breaker’s material welfare is reduced. We focus on the utility from punish-
ment aspect of our model, which we term “cold glow.”2 We compare these decisions to
1This benchmark, formalized by Becker (1968), is the most frequent model used in the economics of
crime literature. We later discuss other possible benchmarks motivated by the idea that psychic costs and
beneﬁts can be allowed to enter the cost-beneﬁt calculation.
2In reference to warm glow theories of altruism, described in Andreoni (1990) and related works.Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 7
those chosen by a Beckerian punisher interested in total social material payoffs. Compared
to this benchmark, cold glow punishers respond to personal shares of cost of punishment
and not to the total burden to the public, can be relatively insensitive to probability of ap-
prehension, and punishment by others may not substitute for own punishments perfectly.
These effects can lead to over or under punishment relative to the deterrence benchmark,
depending on the structure of the environment.
Individual punishment decisions are important in many contexts, ranging from daily
interactions to business organizations. We discuss one such domain of application: how
individual decisions can shape aggregate outcomes in the criminal justice system. Our
theory is most applicable to two such channels: voter behavior (the elections of judges
and legislators) and juries (citizen juries set penalties in tort cases). We survey existing
evidence on behavior of voters, judges and tort juries that is consistent with our theory of
cold glow punishments. We then turn to another method for testing this theory: a series
of laboratory experiments. Our experimental designs allow for transparent calculation of
levels of punishment that would reach normative benchmarks.3 This allows us to not only
ask whether individual behavior responds to particular parameter changes but also whether
aggregate behavior is, in some sense, ‘optimal.’
We present three experiments, in which people can punish a norm violation: taking
from a third party. We vary conditions of sanctions in order to test the role of different
parameters in punishment choices, and how individual behaviors aggregate up.
Our ﬁrst experiment looks at how punishment choices respond costs. The punishment
available in this experiment is excluding norm breakers from the game: when this happens,
they can neither make money nor take from other players. We show that environments
where individuals can punish norm-breakers but do not personally bear the full cost of
their decisions can lead to socially inefﬁcient over-punishment. Our setup is such that
relatively small punishments can implement social goals consistent with motives of general
deterrence, speciﬁc deterrence and incapacitation; yet when costs are not fully internalized,
3Many papers consider the addition of punishment to public goods games (Ostrom et al. (1992)), dictator
games (Fehr and Fischbacher (2004)). Others ask for individuals’ impressions of ‘fair punishments’ in survey
scenarios (Baron and Ritov (1993), Sunstein et al. (2000)). However in these games the calculations for
material payoff maximizing punishments are not as transparent.Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 8
players over-punish. Results from this experiment allow us to conclusively rule out ‘public
goods’ motivations as the sole drivers of high levels of punishment.
Our second experiment investigates the role of probability of apprehension in punish-
ment choices. A player can take from a third party, and we experimentally vary the proba-
bility with which he is found (high or low). We compare ex-ante punishment choices and
taking behavior across conditions. Consistent with our theory, choices of penalty do not
react to changes in probability of apprehension, but taker behavior does. This leads to a dif-
ferent kind of inefﬁcient punishment: levels too low to deter socially destructive behavior.
We replicate these results in a third experiment where assigners give penalties as a reaction
to decider behavior and not as an ex-ante deterrent.
Our ﬁnal experiment looks at whether our ‘cold glow’ terminology is apt. The theory of
‘warm glow’ (Andreoni (1990)) posits that individuals gain private beneﬁts from the act of
contributing to a public good and not from the total share provided. In our ﬁnal experiment,
we ask whether individuals gain private beneﬁt from overall levels of punishments imposed
on norm-breakers, or whether these psychic beneﬁts come from their own contributions to
the punishment. In our study, two individuals make punishment decisions in sequence. We
look at whether the second decision-maker’s punishment decreases with the punishment
of the ﬁrst individual, and ﬁnd that on average, no crowd-out occurs. We replicate these
effects in an experiment where the ﬁrst punisher’s decision is made by a computer.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present our model.
In section 3, we review empirical evidence on ﬁeld behaviors consistent with cold glow.
Sections 4   6 present our experiments, which examine respectively the impact of cost
structures, the effects of probability of apprehension, and crowding out. Section 7 con-
cludes.
2.3 A Model of Third-Party Negative Reciprocity
We ﬁrst present a model punishing behaviors. We look at aggregate outcomes when
punishers care about material social payoffs, and when they also derive utility from punish-
ment itself. We focus on third-party punishment, and ask what parameters affect decisionsChapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 9
depending on the punisher’s motivations.
2.3.1 General Setup
We begin with a simple game with three players: a taker (T), who can take or not take
ft;ntg from a victim, (V ); and a punisher (P) who chooses sP, how much to sanction the
taker. If T chooses to take, V loses sT > 0, and T gains sT. An individual who chose t
is caught with probability p, in which case, they receive the sanction chosen by P, sP: We
treat V as a passive observer. The taker and the victim’s utilities are given by their material
payoffs:
UT(sT;sP) = sT   sP
UV(sT) =  sT
We have  2 [0;1], so that taking is a socially destructive action. Finally, we assume
that sanction level sP has a cost of  > 0 per unit paid for by the punisher P.
We will consider punishers with two types of social preferences: ﬁrst, a punisher who
cares about total material welfare; second, a punisher who gains personal utility from pun-
ishing socially destructive actions. We will apply these models to three types of sanctions:
ex-post punishment, ex-ante punishment commitments, and punishment in the presence of
several punishers.
2.3.2 Material Social Payoff Maximizing Punishers
We ﬁrst consider the case of a punisher who cares about total material welfare: his
goal is to minimize harm, subject to cost. While we allow for ﬂexibility in assessment of
harm and in the relative weight of pro-social and individual considerations, the punisher’s
problem is similar to that of the social planner in Becker (1968), so we will refer to him as
a Beckerian punisher.
The Beckerian punisher’s utility from the action pair (sP;sT) is given by
UP(sP;sT) =  sP + (UV(sP;sT) + (sT)UT(sP;sT)):Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 10
The ﬁrst term reﬂects P’s material payoff, which can only be affected by his choice of
sanction. The second term is P’s social preference;  measures how much weight P puts
on maximizing social efﬁciency relative to his own payoffs. So  = 0 represents a standard
self-interested actor, and  = 1 represents an individual who cares only about the total
material payoff of the rest of society, ignoring his own payoff.4 We let (sT) represent
the weight of the taker’s utility in the punisher’s maximization, which can depend on T’s
actions. When the taker does not take,  = 1 but if they choose to take, P may put a lower
value on the taker’s payoff than on the victim’s.
The ex-post punishment case is trivial: in a one-shot interaction, P would choose a
punishment level of 0; since there are only costs and no beneﬁts to punishment. The ex-
ante case, where P commits to a publicly known level of punishment sP before T makes
their decision, is more interesting. Recall that when he chooses to take, T is found with
(exogenous) probability p, in which case the sanction applies. The taker is perfectly aware
of this law when making her decisions, so she chooses to take if
UT(sT;sP) = sT   psP > 0
From this equation it follows that there is a level sDeter
P (p) above which T will not take,
while below which T prefers to take and that this sDeter
P increases in p. For simplicity,
we assume that when indifferent, T chooses not to take. To avoid off equilibrium path
dynamics, we assume that T trembles to an unintended action with probability  which is
small.
We can also look at P’s utility in different cases:
U(sP) =
8
> > <
> > :
0 if T didn’t take
 sT + (sT)(sT) if T took and was not found
 sP   sT + (sT)(sT   sP) if T took, was found and sP was applied
Assuming that the taker is rational as above, the punisher can maximize this utility with
backward induction. We can show that the only levels of punishment that P ever chooses
4The  = 1 case, where an individual maximizes total material social payoff including his own in the
welfare calculation, is most analogous in our context to the social planner Becker (1968) crime reduction
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are 0 or sDeter
P (p): The punisher wishes to deter T from taking to maximize material social
welfare, but if the potential costs (eg. in the case of a tremble) are too high, then this may
not be worth it.
Note that this choice also depends on the level of , the weight that P puts on social
material welfare relative to his personal costs. This gives the following important implica-
tion: if P’s chosen punishment is not paid for by himself, but by a fourth player (the public)
then P’s maximization problem becomes exactly that of a social planner maximizing to-
tal material welfare. Thus, moving punishment costs from being private to being borne
by the public can only improve total material social welfare with a Beckerian punisher.
If  is small, under such a publicly funded punishment scheme Beckerian punishers will
always set sDeter
P (p), and so punishments decisions will respond strongly to variations in
probability of capture.
Note also that if we think about not a single Beckerian punisher, but two identical
individuals P1 and P2 who each set a punishments, it is easy to show that in any equilibrium
of the game we will have that
sP1 + sP2 2 f0;s
Deter
P (p)g:
Thus, Beckerian punishers will respond to variations in total social cost, probability of
capture and care about total levels of punishment. We now introduce a model of a cold
glow punishment choices and study how aggregate decisions differ.
2.3.3 Choices of Punishment with Negative Reciprocity
We now assume that individuals receive private beneﬁts from negatively affecting the
payoffs of those who have done socially inappropriate actions. We call these private ben-
eﬁts cold glow. Though we do not present it here, our model could be expanded to allow
for individuals to get a private beneﬁt, or warm glow (Andreoni (1990)), from positively
affecting the payoffs of those who have done socially appropriate actions.
We argue that our assumptions about cold glow can be justiﬁed empirically. A large
literature in behavioral economics points to the fact that individuals will often sacriﬁce
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the public goods game (Ostrom et al. (1992)) or the dictator game, even when the individual
choosing to sanction is a third party and has no personal stake in the game itself (Fehr and
Fischbacher(2004)). Thisoccursevenwhenpunishmentscan’tbeusedto‘teachalesson.56
Studies in social neuroscience give evidence that this behavior is driven by pleasure
gained from the sanctions themselves: activity in the brain’s reward areas during costless
punishment can be used to predict punishment behavior in costly punishment situation
(De Quervain et al. (2004)). Furthermore, individuals show reward activity (which corre-
lates with subjective reports) when they watch another individual who cheated them in a
trust game receive electric shocks, but not when the shocks are given to an individual who
had been cooperative (Singer et al. (2006)).
Finally, research in moral psychology hints at the ﬁnal part of our assumption, which
is that this motive is very blunt: it is ‘turned on’ by harm itself and not by intention to
harm. Cushman et al. (2009) ask individuals to play a modiﬁed dictator game, in which
the dictator chooses between dice, with each different die yielding different probabilities of
fair or selﬁsh allocations. After the die is rolled, recipients are allowed to punish or reward
the dictator. The authors ﬁnd that outcomes predict punishment or reward behavior by the
recipients, while intentions (choice of dice) have a smaller effect.
We ﬁrst discuss these preferences in an ex-post decision. We then show how they affect
ex-ante punishment decisions, that is, choices of punishment made when individuals can
credibly commit to sanction a behavior in the future.
Ex-Post Behavior
First, we introduce a basic model of social preferences which depend on the action
taken by another player.7 We start with simple three player model, and then extend it to N
5Fudenberg and Pathak (2010) show that individuals will pay to punish others who behave anti-socially
in public goods games even when the effects of the punishment are not known until the end of the session.
6We also note that harmful acts appear to be punished more harshly when they are caused more directly.
For example, Coffman (2011) shows that third parties punish a harmful act more when an individual himself
commits it than when the same individual uses an intermediary to create the same outcome. To keep our
discussion simpler, we omit such motivations from our model.
7Theories of social preferences in economics can be divided into several categories: theories such as
inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt (1999)) take outcomes as the objects over which utility functions areChapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 13
players.
Three Players The utility functions of the Taker and the Victim are the same as in the
previous sub-section. However, the Punisher’s utility is now a function of both his material
payoff (the ﬁrst term), and his reaction to the Taker’s action:
UP(sT;sP) =  sP + (UT(sT;sP);sT)
The second term in P’s utility, , captures the punisher’s social preferences. The ﬁrst
argument of this function, UT(sT;sP) is the total change (relative to some baseline) to the
taker’s utility that occurs as a result of the punisher’s action. Note that because T’s utility
is linear in sP, the choice of baseline doesn’t matter. Since sT is ﬁxed from the punisher’s
perspective when the punishment is carried out, we simplify the arguments to (sP;sT).
The second argument, tells us how T’s actions affect P’s social preferences over T’s
payoff.
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1.  is smooth and concave in sP:
This is a standard assumption so that we can use our tools of maximization. Note that
we do not very much constrain the shape of . In particular, for any sT,  can either be
always increasing (bigger punishments are always better) or reach a global maximum for a
certain value of sP, which can be thought of as the ‘perfectly fair’ punishment, in line with
just desserts theories.
Assumption 2. We have that
@2(;sT)
@sP@sT
> 0:
Assumption 2 is the driving assumption of our model. It states that as the taker’s action
becomes more inappropriate, the punisher’s attitude towards T’s payoffs becomes increas-
ingly negative (recall that higher sT means a larger transfer from V when T chooses to
take). Our ﬁnal assumption is a normalization:
deﬁned, while fairness theories (eg. Rabin (1993)) take intentions as the important objects. By contrast, we
take actions as well as payoffs as the primary focus of our theory, in this way we are similar to social norms
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Assumption 3. We have that
@
@sP
= 0 if sT = 0:
This tells us that sT = 0 is a ‘neutral’ action which causes P to not feel either posi-
tive or negative strong reciprocity towards T. Note that in a generalized model we could
relax smoothness assumptions for  and our main results would hold. We maintain these
assumptions to make exposition easier.
NotethatbecausesT isﬁxedforex-postbehavior, levelsofinsT areirrelevantforpre-
dicting P’s static behavior. However, assumptions on this will make important statements
about dynamic behavior or welfare. In particular, this allows for the both the situation
where (0;0)  (sP;sT 6= 0) implying that P would prefer to be in a situation where T
takes a neutral action than where he has to exercise reciprocity or the opposite. We turn to
this discussion later. However, without any assumptions on this we can still characterize
behavior for a given sT:
Proposition 1. For any ;sT there exists an optimal action for the punisher s(;sT):
Moreover
1. s
P(;sT) decreases in :
2. s
P(;sT) increases in sT:
The comparative statics are easy to see: ﬁrst, as the price of transfers () increases, P
will provide less of it. Second, P’s sanction of T is increasing in the inappropriateness
of her behavior. There is already some evidence that punishment responds to both prices
and inappropriateness in these ways: Anderson and Putterman (2006) ﬁnd that punishment
in public goods games responds to price effects as a normal good8 while Peysakhovich
and Rand (2012) ﬁnd that reported inappropriateness ratings correlate with punishment
decisions in a dictator game with third party punishment.
We note that we do not need to make these assumptions about how T’s action affects
V ’s payoff. Our model is perfectly consistent with a scenario in which T chooses an action
sT from a continuum, those sT being linearly ordered by ‘social inappropriateness’, where
higher sT actions are considered more inappropriate by P.9
8These are not exactly our scenarios as public goods game punishments are not third party.
9Because we take appropriateness as exogenously given, an important expansion of our project would beChapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 15
Four Players We now move to the case when several individuals observe the taker’s
behavior and can choose to affect his payoff. Suppose now there are four players: the
taker T who can choose to take from the victim V , and two punishers, P and P2, who
move sequentially and can each choose how much to punish the taker, with P2 knowing
P’s decision. T’s utility now looks as follows:
UT(sT;sP;sP2) = sT   sP   sP2
P’s utility function is now as follows:
UT(sT;sP;sP2) =  sP + (sP;sT;sP2)
Keeping the old assumptions on the shape of the  function, there exists a unique
s
P(;sT;s b) describing the original punisher’s optimal choice. What this setup gives us
relative to the three-player setup is the possibility to discuss how P’s punishment choices
interact with that of all other punishing agents. Speciﬁcally our model allows for several
types of behaviors:
Deﬁnition 1. We say that if:
1.
@s
P
@sP2
< 0 (=  1), there is (perfect) crowding out
2.
@s
P
@sP2
> 0 (= 1), there is (perfect) crowding in
3.
@s
P
@sP2
= 0, P’s punishment choice is independent of other punishers’
Crowding out happens if a punisher considers that his and other players’ punishment
choices are substitutes to some degree. When crowding out is perfect (as was the case
for the Beckerian punisher), a punisher only cares about is the overall level of punishment,
similar to the maximum-deterrence punisher. When crowding out is imperfect, the punisher
also cares about how he changes the taker’s utility.10
to consider how appropriateness of various actions can be endogenously generated. We leave this nuance for
future work.
10This is the ﬂip side of ‘warm glow’ as discussed in Andreoni (1993) or Cornes and Sandler (1994) for
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Crowding in, on the contrary, implies that P’s choice of punishment will be an increas-
ing function of the other players’ choices of punishment: the more other players punish, the
more P punishes. Our model is mostly reduced form; one interpretation is that crowding
in results from an imperfect knowledge on P’s part about of how wrong T’s action was.
With this uncertainty in place, other players’ actions serve as a signal and so can lead to
crowding in of punishments.11
Note, again, that we do not make any assumptions on the behavior of levels of  in s b,
as this variable is exogenous for P. For example, we make no assumptions about whether
P prefers situations in which other individuals are also allowed to punish guilty individuals.
Note that assumptions on this will also inform dynamic behavior.
Whichbehaviorholdsatindividuallevelinanempiricalquestion. Theoverallaggregate
levels of punishment in society will depend on the relative proportions of decision-makers
who display either behavior. We study this question in experiment 3.
Ex-Ante Punishments
So far, we have only looked at P’s ex-post punishment decisions, taking T’s action sT
asﬁxed. However, mostpunishmentdecisionsaresetex-ante: lawsandrulesaresetoutand
potential norm-breakers are presumed to know the laws. To better understand this situation,
we now turn to incorporating ex-ante motives into our theory of punishment behavior. We
do so in a highly reduced form way to get our main intuitions across.
First, we modify the order of the game and simplify the strategy space: P ﬁrst sets out
a sanction, sP, to which he commits. T, having seen this sanction, makes a choice from
the set ft;ntg where t (taking) is some ﬁxed sT > 0 and NT is sT = 0: If T chooses t, she
gets a ﬁxed beneﬁt of k; she is caught and has P’s sanction applied to her with probability
p. Note here that P only pays for the sanction if it has to be implemented.
We assume that P has a map  (sP;p) which represents his probabilistic assessment that
T will choose t given a sanction of size sP: Further, we assume that the function is smooth,
that  (sP;p) decreases in sP; that   is bounded away from 0 to avoid off equilibrium
dynamics and that the cross partial is negative. Intuitively, these assumptions correspond to
11As in Bardsley and Sausgruber (2005) or Glazer and Konrad (1996).Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 17
P believing that higher sanctions decrease taking and that higher sanctions decrease taking
more when probability of being caught is higher.
We leave open many possible choices of  ;. For example, P could have rational expec-
tations about T’s behavior. One way to create a particular choice for   is to assume a well
behaved distribution of types k for T with k 2 [0;kmax] distributed according to pdf f().
Each type gets utility k from choosing t and uses a simple cost beneﬁt tradeoff between ex-
pected sanction and expected beneﬁt to make decisions and trembles with probability . If
P does not know T’s type, but knows the distribution f(), we will obtain a   function that
satisﬁes our criteria. We also leave open the possibility that P may be partially strategically
naive:   can be derived from a level-k thinking (Costa-Gomes et al. (2003)) or cognitive
hierarchy (Camerer et al. (2004)) model.12
To make ex-ante decisions, P maximizes the following expected utility:
 (sP;p)[p((sP;T)   sP) + (1   p)((0;T))] + (1    (sP;p))(0;0):
Note that now the difference in levels (sP) = (0;0) (sP;T) matters. If (sP) > 0
for all possible values of sP, P prefers to be in the situations where T does not take and
he does not punish than in a situation where T takes and P is forced to act. This means
that P’s ex-ante punishments incorporate a form of a deterrence motive.13 Having an extra
motive for punishments gives us the following result:
Proposition 2. For generic choice of   there exists unique s
b that is the optimal ex-ante
punishment. Moreover this ex-ante punishment is always weakly greater than what would
be imposed for sT = t in the ex-post problem above.
This proposition means that ex-ante and ex-post punishments are different in theory, but
does not explain how large this difference is. What determines this difference is the relative
12We point out that understanding how accurate individuals are in their beliefs about how punishment
levels affect decisions of potential criminals is an important topic at the intersection of law and psychology
but we do not discuss it further here.
13This also means that our model nests a decision-maker who cares only about the deterrence aspects of
punishments by setting
@
@sP
to be constantly 0. In this case (sP) is exactly the weight that P puts on the
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shapes of  and  : There are three interesting cases to consider. The easiest is where P
is completely strategically naive and believes that T chooses T with a ﬁxed probability no
matter the sanction. This then reduces the ex-ante decision to the ex-post punishment case.
The second case is where most of the change in   happens at low levels of sP: One
such example sets  (sP;p) = 1 if sP <  and  (sP;p) = q for sP   with q and  very
small. Here cold glow motives push punishments above where they would be if P simply
had a taste for deterrence (which would dictate that he simply set a punishment of ).
However, there could be other possibilities. Consider a scenario where  (sP;p) = 1 for
sP < K where K is large and  (sP;p) =  for sP > K: Thus, only very large punishments
are deterring, but once the threshold is reached most taking behavior goes away (this could
happen, for example, if T is rational, the beneﬁts of T are modest and p is very low). Now,
add to this a (;T) which is single peaked in the ﬁrst argument (that is, P has an optimal
‘fair’ punishment) and further suppose that this peak, sb; is much smaller than K: Set 
very close to 0: Now an optimally deterring punishment would be one of size K; but P
may choose a punishment much lower than this. Intuitively, this is because by setting a
punishment K; P commits to choosing an action that is highly suboptimal, from his point
of view, in the positive probability state of the world where T takes and is punished.
Thus, while cold glow gives P a deterrence motive for punishment, it also gives him
other motives which he must trade off during his decision-making. We characterize the
relative sizes of some of these motives in experiment 2.
2.3.4 Welfare Implications
We now compare parameters that matter for cold glow punishers relative to Beckerian
punishers, and discuss other possible social benchmarks. Let’s ﬁrst discuss how cold glow
P chooses a punishment whose cost is shared between P and P2 (so P pays

2 per unit of
punishment).
We begin with the ex-post case where T has already chosen to take and has been caught.
By our analysis above, P will make the choice that equates his marginal beneﬁt from cold
glow to its marginal cost (here

N). This will lead to higher levels of punishment that those
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is not included into aggregate welfare, or if it is a private good which only beneﬁts the
punisher, but not the rest of society, then sharing costs could lead to over-punishing. We
will test this in experiment 1.
One could also assume that each member of society receives cold glow utility from
punishmentandhaspreferencesidenticaltoP, andthatallchoicesarelegitimatereﬂections
of welfare. In this case, P acts as the representative agent for society. However, even if we
take cold glow to be a legitimate source of welfare, problems can arise. For example, we
can consider a simple extension to our game where individuals can select into the role of
punisher.14 With sorting in place, individuals with ‘the strongest’ cold glow have incentives
to sort into particular positions and it is unclear that individual maximization will lead to
socially optimal outcomes even if cold glow enters into the calculation of social welfare.
We can also consider the opposite view. Behavioral economists (e.g. Kahneman et
al. (1997)) often break utility down into two components: decision utility, the maximizer
of which is P’s choice, and experienced utility, which can be used for welfare compar-
isons. Taking such a point of view, cold glow reﬂects how individuals make decisions but
doesn’t tell us the whole story about how these decisions make them better or worse off.
Finally, there is the important matter of how to weigh T’s decrease in payoffs against the
gains of other players. Moving to the ex-ante case (for example, setting laws or voting for
politicians) adds even more complications to the discussion.
So far, we’ve given brief and by no means exhaustive list of possible ways to think
about how cold glow motives should enter into aggregate welfare calculations. However,
in each of these, one thing is clear: it is quite unlikely that the solution to the individual
punisher’s maximization problem, or to those of many such punishers, would in general
aggregate up to produce socially optimal outcomes.
Our experiments test how parameters enter into individual level decisions, and they are
set up in such a way that we can calculate what punishment would satisfy the Beckerian
punisher’s preferences. This lets us make statements both about what individuals seem to
be doing and about whether their aggregate actions lead to socially optimal outcomes, and
14In the criminal justice system, this could happen via matching mechanisms, for example if more punitive
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if not, how badly they miss the target.
2.4 Punishment Behavior in the Field: Criminal Justice
Before we turn to our experiments, we discuss how our investigation into the interaction
between psychological motives and institutional structures ﬁts into understanding impor-
tant outcomes. So far, we have developed a stylized model of punishment behavior and
how this behavior can lead to situations in which punishments set by individuals miss our
normative benchmark. There are many important situations in which punishment decisions
can affect aggregate outcomes and where we could apply such an analysis: organizations,
work in groups, driving, and so on. Here, we limit our scope to a particular application:
socially provisioned punishment via the criminal justice system.
We now review existing empirical work which is consistent with our model and dis-
cuss how cold glow motivations could affect aggregate outcomes through the behaviors
and preferences of voters, juries and judges. We then turn to discussing how lab experi-
ments can be integrated into an empirical strategy for understanding the aggregate effects
of individual motivations.
Demand for punishment for private motives can affect aggregate outcomes through the
behavior of elected ofﬁcials. First, we note that if the punishment of criminals is indeed
treated by voters as a private good which is provided at public cost, this would lead to
demand for punishment even in the absence of clear effects on the crime reduction. There
is qualitative discussion of this phenomenon: for example, legal sociologist David Garland
argues that the most publicized measures (such as three strike laws, or Megan’s law) have
little effect on controlling crime but tend to become law due to “their immediate ability
to enact public sentiment, to provide an instant response [or] to function as a retaliatory
measure” (Garland (2001)).
In addition to descriptive evidence, causal links have been identiﬁed: Berdejo and
Yuchtman (2009) analyze changes in sentencing behavior of judges during election cycles.
They ﬁnd that judge severity increases15 when they are close to reelection and thus un-
15Furthermore, the authors ﬁnd that this variation is due to discretionary departure above sentencing guide-Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 21
der political pressure from constituents, and sentences fall immediately afterwards. These
results cannot be explained by differential work loads due to longer sentencing and vari-
ations in the month of nomination and election allow the authors to rule out seasonality
or confounding political changes. This phenomenon of pre-election increase in sentences,
immediately followed by a drop, is consistent with a model in which judges’ preferences
differ from individual voters’ decisions, which are driven by the cold glow heuristic.
Cold glow could also affect outcomes in the criminal justice system through the behav-
ior of judges themselves. We view that as a less likely place of inﬂuence, since judges are
speciﬁcally trained and make their decisions in a deliberate manner, perhaps mitigating the
effects of cold glow. There has been a recent resurgence of interest in studying judicial
behavior (Posner (2008), Danziger et al. (2011)) which has put forth at least some evidence
that judges are subject to predictable biases, so perhaps it is not impossible that cold glow
is partially at play during judicial decisions.
In addition, there is some evidence in law and economics pointing to the fact that in-
dividuals may not believe that it is “fair” to factor probability of capture into punishment
decisions (see Polinsky and Shavell (2000) for a discussion and Sunstein et al. (2000) for
two survey-based experiments). Insensitivity to probability of capture by punishers, an
important input into optimal deterrence, is a behavior that cold glow punishers can display.
There has been no research directly assessing the effect of cost structures on demand
for punishment, even though the question of costs of punishment has received attention
from policy makers due to the budget crises in many states.16 The only paper to investi-
gates the effect of a change of costs on punishment decisions is Ater et al. (2012). They
exploit a quasi-experimental change in costs of arrests in Israel: the responsibility of hous-
ing arrestees awaiting trial was transferred from local police to the prison authority. The
authors ﬁnd a sharp increase in arrests as a result of this policy, which is consistent with an
imperfect factoring in of total costs of crime reduction when making arrest decisions.17
lines, and not greater compliance to these guidelines.
16In particular, in California, one response has been to transfer housing of inmates from state prisons to
county jails, with the argument that this would lower overall costs of criminal justice.
17We note there are many other possible explanations for these results: police ofﬁcers’ effort provision
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Additionally, whether individual punishment decisions are crowded out by already per-
formed punishments could play a role in labor markets. There has been discussion on the
role that having a criminal record plays employability of an individual (Bushway et al.
(2007), Pager (2007)). One way this can occur is through a signaling channel (Rasmusen
(1996)) where conviction is a signal of poor worker. However, if cold glow motives are
not crowded out by already performed punishments, there may be a second channel for this
effect: a lack of hiring can act as a sanction towards an individual who has committed an
inappropriate act. The relative sizes of each of these effects matter quite a bit for choices
of particular policies (for example, shrouding criminal records).
All in all, a lot of empirical facts can be explained by cold glow motivations playing
a role in decisions which affect important aggregate outcomes. However, these decisions
are a product of many factors: elections involve many non-judicial dimensions, juries are
prompted to depart from emotions,18 and exact magnitudes of costs or probabilities of
apprehension are generally not known precisely by voters, juries or judges. In order to
conclusively isolate the role and magnitude of cold glow in aggregate outcomes, we would
ideally need data on voter, jury and judicial behaviors responding to (quasi) experimental
variations in costs of judgments and probability of apprehension. Beyond the practical
difﬁculties of implementing such a protocol, it would be difﬁcult even in this scenario to
isolate the exact mechanisms at play. To build our understanding of how cold glow interacts
with institutions, we examine the behavior of individuals in a stylized setting using a series
of laboratory experiments. These experimental methods allow us to study, in a controlled
environment, punishment choices which are normally hard to observe in the ﬁeld. For this
reason, they are an important piece of a larger portfolio of methods that can help us to
analyze and evaluate how cold glow motivations affect aggregate outcomes.
18For example, French jurors verbally pledge that they will “not listen to hatred or malice or fear or affec-
tion; [and decide] according to [their] conscience and [their] inner conviction, with the impartiality and rigor
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2.5 Experiment 1: Responses to Costs
In this ﬁrst experiment we test an individual level hypothesis: when costs of punishment
accrue to the group rather than to the individual, will individuals increase their punishment
decisions? At the social level, the game is set up so that very low levels of punishment are
sufﬁcient to deter potential norm breakers. Simultaneously, our transfer of costs to society
also increases the overall cost of the punishment beyond what would be consistent with
using motives such as incapacitation as the social benchmark. We then ask: will individual
punishment decisions meet or exceed our social benchmarks?
2.5.1 Experimental Design
We run a series of experiments in which we vary the availability and cost structure
of sanctions. In our game, participants gain Monetary Units (MU) throughout the experi-
ment, which are converted into dollars at a rate of 50 MU per dollar. Players are randomly
matched in groups of n = 8 to 12 players. Each group is given a public pot of 70  n
MU, which is equally split amongst all members of the group at the end of the game. Each
player is also individually given 30 MU at the beginning of the game.
Participants play 20 rounds (one iteration) of the following game. They are asked to
solve a simple math problem, for which they receive 4 MU upon completion. They are
then given the possibility to “take.” If a player chooses to take, she receives 2 MU, and
another randomly selected player loses 3 MU. Taking, in this case, is a socially destructive
behavior; yet, in the absence of sanctions, it is a dominant strategy. When a player chooses
to take, she is found out in 50% of cases. Our conditions and treatments consist of varying
what happens when a player is found out.
In the “No Punishment” condition, when a player is found out, she gets a message in-
forming her that she has been found out, but nothing more happens. In both “Punishment”
conditions, when a player is found out, another random player is chosen to be her “as-
signer.” The assigner is able to punish found out players by excluding them from the game
for up to 10 rounds. We elicit punishment using the strategy method: individuals choose a
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but before they are informed of whether they were found out, or if they were someone’s
assigner. They are asked at this point to enter an amount of penalty rounds that they would
assign if they are chosen as an assigner for this round. Individuals can never be chosen
as their own assigner, nor do they know which player they assign penalty rounds to. In
particular, if they were taken from, there is no additional chance that they will assign a
punishment to the player who took from them. In all conditions, only the assigner and the
individual to whom penalty rounds are allocated learn about the punishment level chosen.
Each round of exclusion is costly, and we vary the cost structure. In the “Private Pun-
ishment” (hereafter Private) condition, if a player’s punishment is chosen, they will pay
2MU from their private money for each round of punishment they have imposed. In the
“Public Punishment” (hereafter Public) condition, if a player’s punishment is chosen, each
round costs 5 MU from the public pot. This means that in the Public condition, the private
share of the cost to a particular punisher is less than 2 MU per round. This experimental
setup will allow us to investigate cost effects in demand for punishment, thus determining
if demand for punishment looks like demand for a private good.
As a robustness check, we include one more condition. In the “One Round Take” con-
dition, subjects play 1 round in which they can take and punish (with the public costs struc-
ture), followed by 10 rounds in which the take option is not available. In this case, since
subjects cannot take for the following rounds of the interaction, future oriented motives
(incapacitation or deterrence) cannot explain any choice of punishment. This is similar to
the design employed by Fudenberg and Pathak (2010) who have individuals play multiple
rounds of public goods games which include sanctions
In each experimental session, individuals are ﬁrst put into a group to play one iteration
of the No Punishment condition. After a random rematching into new groups, they play
either one iteration of Public, one iteration of Private, or 3 iterations of One Round Take.19
We implement this design for several reasons: it allows individuals to gain experience with
the experiment in the ﬁrst stage, and it allows us to look for correlations between individual
behavior in No Punishment and their later behavior when punishment is available.
19Participants are not informed about the full structure of the experiment, they are only given instructions
for their current condition. However, participants are informed when the One Round Take condition is the
ﬁnal game in the experiment.Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 25
Our experimental design is different from other experimental designs assessing the role
of non-altruistic motives for punishment. We vary the cost structure of punishment, which
allows us both to discuss the institutional setup of ﬁnancing sanctions, and to investigate
the private beneﬁts from punishment, using a basic economics framework. Second, the
punishment in this game is not ﬁnes, as in prior experiments, but exclusion for a certain
number of rounds. This is allows us to include an analysis of incapacitation, and therefore
contribute to the discussion of different motives of incarceration motives in the economics
of crime literature.
The experiment was conducted at the Harvard Decision Science Laboratory using the
z-Tree software (Fischbacher (2007)), in June and July 2012.20 The participants, recruited
using the Decision Science Laboratory pool, were university students (mean age: 21.5
years old, 58% female) in the Boston area. We have a total of 91 participants: 39 in Public,
28 in Private and 24 in One Round Take.
Participants were given a 10 dollar show-up fee, and their experimental earnings were
converted at a rate of 50 MU per dollar. The experiment took between 40 and 50 minutes
to complete. Participants earned between 17 and 23 dollars. They were informed of exper-
imental earnings for each condition independently, and their ﬁnal earnings were privately
announced to them at the end of the experiment.
Our main outcome variable in this series of experiments is the choice of number of
rounds of punishment for potential found takers. This is our measure of how much sanction
players are willing to support when facing different cost structure.
2.5.2 Theories of Punishment
There are three major normative theories of punishment in the law and economics lit-
erature: incapacitation, general deterrence and speciﬁc deterrence. Our experimental setup
allow us to discuss what kind of social benchmarks each of these motives sets. We brieﬂy
present these motives and how they form benchmarks in our experimental setup. Table 2.11
in the appendix summarizes predictions for these different motives.
20Appendix 1 presents the experimental instructionsChapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 26
Incapacitation
Incapacitation is the prevention of offending by removal of offenders. Shavell (1987)
determines the optimal level of punishment to achieve cost-efﬁcient incapacitation. He
ﬁnds that incapacitation to be cost-efﬁcient, the cost of incarceration (or, in our setup, of
removing a player for N rounds) has to be lower than the expected harm that individual
could do while incapacitated.
In our setup, even if we assume that an individual does not respond to deterrence in-
centives and always chooses to take, the maximal harm that individuals can do is to take 3
MU from one (random) player in each round. In the Public condition, the cost of removing
this individual is 5 MU. Thus, from a perspective of maximizing social payoffs (even if we
assume that ‘bad’ (taking) individuals’ payoffs do not enter into this calculation), the cost
of incapacitation outweighs its beneﬁts.
In the Private condition, since the cost is 2 but the social beneﬁt is 3 there may be
pro-social incapacitation motives. However, from an individual payer’s perspective, the
expected harm per round of a rogue individual is 3
n; whereas the cost of removing the
player is of 5
n per round. Thus there is no private incarceration motive either.21
Finally, intheOneRoundTaketreatment, exclusioncannotbechosenforincapacitation
motives, since the punishment applies to rounds in which it is impossible for the punished
players to take.
Deterrence
General deterrence is the impact of the threat of future punishment on behaviors. In
out setup, players cannot increase general deterrence by setting higher punishments. Only
players who are found out learn about other players’ punishment choices, and even then,
only their assigner’s choice of penalty rounds. General threats therefore cannot be emitted.
Speciﬁc deterrence, however, could be a consideration. In order to investigate this
possibility, we consider several possible assumptions on takers’ behaviors.
21One may argue that risk averse players would prefer to pay a cost of 5
n for sure rather than lose 3
n with
some probability, and thus that incapacitation can be seen as a form of private insurance against rogue group
members. We note that this critique does not apply in the One Round Take condition.Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 27
Assumption 1: Takers are rational criminals. In this case, average punishment should
be  1 round. By being excluded for 1 round in 50% of cases, potential thieves lose in
expectation 2 units,22 which is exactly what they gain from taking. As long as participants
taking are slightly risk averse, 1 round of punishment will be enough to deter them from
taking. Excluding player for more than 1 round cannot be for only speciﬁc deterrence
motives.23
Assumption 2 : Takers can be “taught a lesson” if punishment is higher than a certain
threshold. We present a simple mathematical model of speciﬁc deterrence with reform
in the appendix. The main results of our model is that though we can rationalize many
different average levels of punishment, depending on individual beliefs, for ﬁxed beliefs,
the amount of punishment should decrease as the game gets closer to the end. This is
becausethevalueofreformingindividualsdecreases, sincetherearelessroundsoverwhich
beneﬁts from reform can be reaped, but the cost of punishment stays the same.
Assumption 3 : Takers always take, and cannot be reformed. This case reduces to the
incapacitation case.
Finally, and regardless of our assumptions about takers’ behaviors, in the One Round
Take treatment, no positive exclusion can be rationalized by a speciﬁc deterrence motives,
since taking is only possible in the ﬁrst round of this treatment condition.
Cold Glow
Contrarily to pro-social motives, cold glow predicts that punishment in Public would
be higher than in the Private. Private beneﬁts from cold glow motives will be over con-
sumed when costs are not fully internalized. Additionally, cold glow is the only motivation
consistent with any non-zero punishment in the One Round Take condition.
22The math exercise – adding up 2 numbers – is easy: players get it right in 98,7% of cases. Furthermore,
no participants systematically make mistakes: only 1 participant makes more than 2 mistakes, over the 40
additions participants are asked to do. We therefore assume that loss from exclusion for 1 round is equal to 4.
23One reason why individuals might choose punishments greater than 1 for speciﬁc deterrence motives is
if they think that other players would punish less, because those players do not care about deterrence as a
public good. There is however no reason for the average punishment in the public condition to be higher than
average punishment in the private condition for this reason, unless individuals believe that others punish less
in the latter compared to the former.Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 28
2.5.3 Experiment 1 Results
This ﬁrst section compares Public to the Private condition. We present graphs along
with body text and regression analysis in the Appendix. We then present additional evi-
dence from One Round Take as a robustness check.
Punishment Decisions
We ﬁrst look at punisher’s decisions. Figure 2.1 presents the number of rounds of
punishment chosen in Public and Private conditions.24
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Figure 2.1: Mean punishment level chosen by round
The average begins at roughly the same level (approximately 3:5 rounds of exclusion).
However, punishment decreases sharply in Private but not the Public conditions after the
ﬁrst 5 rounds. After this short learning period, average punishment settles to 1:3 rounds in
Private and stays at 3:5 in Public.
The fact that punishment levels stay the same over rounds in the Public condition is a
24As a reminder: all players who are not currently excluded from the game can choose a punishment.Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 29
ﬁrst indication that speciﬁc deterrence cannot be the only motivation at play: as partici-
pants get closer to the end of the game, the size of imposed punishment does not down.
Furthermore, the average levels of punishment chosen in the Public condition far exceed
than the levels in line with optimal deterrence or incapacitation.
Robustness check To conclusively rule out deterrence or incapacitation as the only mo-
tives for punishment, we also consider the One Round Take condition. Figure 2.2 shows the
average punishment decisions made in rounds 6+ of the Private and Public conditions, and
in all iterations of the One Round Take condition. Participants in One Round Take choose
an average of 2:5 rounds of exclusion compared to 3:5 rounds in Public and 1:7 in Private.
The fact that One Round Take punishments are positive, and higher than in the private con-
dition shows that cold glow, as a private beneﬁt to punishment, is a major motivating force
of punishment decisions.
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Figure 2.2: Mean punishment level chosen, round  5
Table 2.2 presents regression results that conﬁrm the intuitions presented in the graphs.
We regress amount of punishment chosen on a dummy taking values 0 for Private and 1 for
Public. Standard errors are clustered by participant.Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 30
Column 1 presents results for the full sample; column 3 presents decisions made from
rounds 6 to 20. Participants in the private treatment choose smaller levels of punishment
than in the public treatment. This holds when we control for round effects (column 2).
Column 1 (2) of table 2.3 shows the difference in number of rounds of exclusion chosen
in One Round Take and Private (Public). In this speciﬁcation, the One Round Take con-
dition is signiﬁcantly higher than Private and lower than Public. In column 3, we pool the
data to tease apart the relative importance of public motives (deterrence and incapacitation)
and cost structures in choices of punishment. We regress punishment choices on a dummy
for costs being public (Public and One Round Take conditions) vs. Private; and a dummy
for public good (deterrence or incapacitation) motives (Public and Private conditions) vs.
One Round Take condition. The coefﬁcients on these dummies represent the effects of cold
glow vs. public goods motives in punishment decisions. The ﬁrst dummy is signiﬁcantly
positive: people choose more rounds of exclusion when the costs are public. The second
dummy is negative, smaller in magnitude but not signiﬁcant implying that non-cold glow
motives play a weak role in punishment behavior in our experiment.25
Taken together, our regression analyses conﬁrm that cold glow is a major motivation in
punishment decisions. Other motives also exist, but cannot explain most of the variation in
punishment. We now turn to see the effects of conditions on taking decisions.
Taking Decisions
Figure 2.3 shows taking decisions by availability of punishment, and table 2.1 presents
our regression results. Taking behavior is signiﬁcantly higher in Punishment and No Pun-
ishment conditions (column 1), which shows that general deterrence does matter: only 10%
to 20% of participants who are able to take26 choose to do so, even from round 1. However,
there is no difference between the Public and Private conditions (column 3), and we ﬁnd
no session effects (column 2).
We ﬁnd a slight learning effect in the No Punish condition. Approximately 70% of
25Another possible explanation for the difference in behavior between One Round Take and Public is that
perhaps it is easier to ex-post rationalize punishment decisions in the former than in the latter.
26i.e. players who are not currently excluded from the gameChapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 31
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Figure 2.3: Percent choosing take
individuals take in the ﬁrst round and by the 5th round, 85% of participants choose to take.
There is no signiﬁcant difference between experimental sessions.
Individual Differences
So far, we have compared results across treatments. We now turn to individual vari-
ations within treatments. First, we ask what causes the learning effect that we ﬁnd in
the Private condition. We ﬁnd that punishment levels decrease after a player’s choice is
implemented27 in Private condition, but not in the Public condition. Table 2.4 shows the
regression of punishment decisions on a dummy which takes value 1 in each round after
an individual’s punishment choice is implemented. On average(column 1), it appears that
having paid for punishment does not inﬂuence choice of sentences (column 1). However,
the effects are heterogeneous across treatment conditions (columns 2-4): in Private, sub-
jects punish signiﬁcantly less once their punishment has been chosen. We interpret this as
a form of ‘sticker shock.’
27In other words, when she is randomly chosen to be a found individual’s punisher.Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 32
We also attempt to see whether behavior in No Punishment conditions predicts pun-
ishment behavior in later stages. We ﬁnd an effect for individuals who take less than 15
times in the original No Punishment rounds, whom we refer to as “low takers”. They also
give much smaller punishments on average (Column 5 of table 2.2).28 This result would be
interesting to investigate in future experiments, as it suggests negative correlation in warm
and cold glow.
2.6 Experiment 2: Responses to Probability of Apprehen-
sion
Our second experiment asks whether punishers’ decisions react when probability of
apprehension (and thus optimally deterring punishments) change. We see how potential
norm-breakers in turn react to punishers’ behaviors. If punishers don’t react to these
changes, this can lead to an outcome where socially wasteful low levels of punishment
can occur. In addition, we compare ex-ante and ex-post punishment decisions.
2.6.1 Experimental Setup
We use a game to test both how sentences are chosen, and how potential norm-breakers
respond to expected punishments.29 The basic setup is as follows: players are matched into
groups of three to play a one shot game. They begin with a balance of 80 points.
Players are randomly assigned one of three roles: assigner, taker, or target. All rules of
the game are known to all players before they begin the experiment. The game proceeds
as follows: the assigner commits to a publicly known level of penalty units (between 0 and
10), each of these units corresponds to a 10 point sanction. Knowing this level of sanction,
the taker decides to take or not from the target. If the taker choose to take, they gain 20
points, and the target loses 30 points. The taker is found out with probability p: If the taker
28Our results are robust to changes in the deﬁnition of “low takers”. We chose this speciﬁcation, as it took
about 5 rounds for taking behavior to plateau at 90% in the No Punishment condition.
29Experimental instructions are presented in the appendixChapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 33
is found out, they are imposed the sanction chosen by the assigner. The assigner is charged
1 point per 5 points of sanction they assign.
Our treatments vary in the probability that the taker will be found if he takes: in the
“high probability” treatment, the taker is found with a probability 9=10; in the “low prob-
ability” treatment, with a probability 1=3.30 All players are informed of all rules at the
beginning of the game. Final payoffs depend on choices made by all of the players. Fi-
nally, the targets make no choice in our game, but we ask them to enter what they think
would be a “fair” punishment for a taker who chooses to take.
We used the online labor market Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT) to recruit individ-
uals to play the game for a show-up fee of :3 USD and an additional payment depending
on points earned, using a conversion rate of 2 points per :01 USD at the end of the experi-
ment.31
We recruited a total of 340 individuals (mean age: 28:8, 63% male) to play this game.
Each individual played exactly one role in the interaction. To make sure that all participants
understood the experiment they were ﬁrst given a set of instructions followed by a three
question comprehension quiz (see Appendix). If they failed to answer any of the quiz
questions correctly, they were not allowed to play the game. Thus all of our results are
from participants who answered all comprehension questions correctly. Dropping non-
comprehenders, we are left with 243 individuals (a 71 % pass rate).
30Some studies in psychology have investigated the effects of probability of apprehension on punishment
decisions. These studies directly ask participants to compare hypothetical punishments in different scenarios
when probabilities of apprehension change (Baron and Ritov (2009)), or asked participants to assess the
relative importance of deterrence or moral motives on punishment decisions (Carlsmith et al. (2002)). In
these hypothetical contexts, players state that do not want to change behaviors based on probabilities of
apprehension. Our experiment adds to this literature as a very strong test of whether punishers respond to
probability and deterrence motives. In our games rules are perfectly transparent and deterring punishments
are very easy to calculate.
31Several recent studies have been undertaken to examine the validity of experimental data collected using
AMT at stakes of  1 USD. They ﬁnd that behavior on AMT matches well with standard laboratory results
on economics games (Amir et al. (2012)) (Rand et al. (in Press)), and are based on samples that are more
representative of the general population (Horton et al. (2011), Paolacci et al. (2010)).Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 34
2.6.2 Experiment 2: Results
Punisher Behavior
We now consider the behavior of punishers across conditions. Part a of ﬁgure 2.4
presents assigners’ average punishment levels for each of the probability conditions. Mean
punishment levels are exactly the same in both treatments: probability of apprehension is
not a parameter individuals respond to in punishment choices. The mean punishment level
is 4:0 in the high probability condition and 4:1 in the low probability, and the difference
non-signiﬁcant (see table 2.5).
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Figure 2.4: Experiment 2: punishers’ and takers’ behaviors
Decisions to Take
We ﬁnd that takers’ behaviors, however, do respond to probability of apprehension on
the intensive margin. We use the strategy method to elicit choices of taking: takers are
asked to enter their maximum acceptable possible penalty (MAPP). This is a number of
penalty units such that if the assigner chooses a penalty below or equal to this level, theChapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 35
taker prefers to take. If the assigner chooses a larger penalty, the taker would prefer not to
take. We perform analyses on choices of MAPP to understand takers’ behaviors.
We ﬁrst ﬁnd that a relatively large amount of participants (approximately 30 %) who
choose a MAPP of 0, indicating that they do not wish to take under any circumstances, in
both conditions. Table 2.6 shows our regression results conﬁrming there is no signiﬁcant
extensive margin response. However, focusing on the 70% of individuals who entered a
MAPP > 0, we ﬁnd that there is an effect on the intensive margin: as shown in part b of
ﬁgure 2.4, individuals who choose to take at all choose different levels of MAPP between
probabilityconditions(mean MAPPinlow= 5.1, andmeanMAPP inhigh=3.8). Table2.6
shows our regression results, conﬁrming there is a signiﬁcant intensive margin response.32
Unlikepunishers, takersrespondtotheprobabilityofbeingcaught,33 andsothepunishment
levels chosen are too low to deter a lot of taker in the low probability condition.
2.6.3 Control Study: Ex-Post Punishments
A key part of our theory is that we allow for both an ex-ante (simulating a strategic
motive such as deterrence) and an ex-post (or ‘just desserts’) component. To assess the size
of these components, we ran a control experiment on AMT (n=194, age=28.9, 63 % male).
The setup of the game in our control study is identical, except that the order of moves is
switched: takers ﬁrst choose to take or not, and then assigners choose ex-post penalties to
assign to takers who are caught. We use the same probability conditions in this study. This
has the added beneﬁt of acting as a robustness check on taker behavior from our original
study where one possible confound is that takers could have found the strategy method
confusing.
Figure 2.5 shows the results. We ﬁnd that punishers again do not respond to probability
of apprehension when choosing levels of ex-post punishment (mean punishment in low =
3.4, mean punishment in high = 3.2). Takers, however, do take probability into account:
32We also ﬁnd a gender effect. Women are less likely to take, and if they are willing to take, they enter
lower maximum acceptable punishment levels. We note that this can be explained by higher risk aversion
(Eckel and Grossman (2008)).
33This also allows us to control away a lack of attention or understanding by participants as the result of
the null effect on punishment decisions as individuals are randomly assigned into roles.Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 36
25 % of individuals take in high probability condition and 43 % take in the low probability
condition34.
2
3
4
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
p
u
n
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
33% found 90% found
Punishers
0
.
2
5
.
5
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
 
t
a
k
i
n
g
33% found 90% found
Takers
Figure 2.5: Study 2 Control Decisions
Comparisons
We now pool our data and compare the ex-ante and ex-post punishment conditions
using regressions. Table 2.7 presents full sample results: as in the main sample, we ﬁnd
that neither choice to punish nor punishment level respond to probability of apprehension.
Furthermore, in the control condition, assigners still choose a positive level of pun-
ishment, even though this is a one-time interaction and punishments are privately costly.
However, we conﬁrm that levels of punishment are smaller when no deterrence motive is
possible than when the assigner plays ﬁrst: this indicates that some difference (approxi-
mately 20 percent) between ex-ante and ex-post punishments does seem to exist, however
these differences are not signiﬁcant. These results are consistent with the differences found
34This difference is signiﬁcant, though only at the 10% level, due to sample size. The magnitude stays the
same – 20 percentage points difference – and becomes signiﬁcant at the 5% level when we control for genderChapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 37
in our ﬁrst experiment between the One Round Take condition and the Public condition.
We conclude that some form of deterrence motives do exist in the punishment choices, but
ex-post ‘just desserts’ thinking seems to be the dominant motivator of punishment behavior
in our samples.
2.6.4 Fairness Judgments
Finally, we look at judgments of ‘fair punishments’ for caught takers from the point
of view of the target. Their answers do not appear to differ across conditions (mean fair
punishment in low, ex-ante = 4.3, high, ex-ante = 5, low, ex-post = 5.3, high, ex-post = 5.5).
Table 2.8 presents our regression analysis. Unsurprisingly, targets want higher pun-
ishments than assigners: this could be driven either by differences between second-party
and third-party punishment (Fehr and Fischbacher (2004)), or because targets do not have
to pay for chosen punishments. Interestingly, neither order of punishment assignment nor
probability of being caught changes targets’ beliefs about fairness: no extra retribution is
demanded when probability of apprehension is lower: differences are not signiﬁcant, and
if anything the point estimates go in the wrong direction. All data taken together, neither
punishers nor victims respond to probability of apprehension when choosing punishment
levels, although this parameter seems to matter a lot in the decisions of potential norm-
breakers.
2.7 Experiment 3: Crowding Out
Our ﬁnal experiment asks an individual level question motivated by our theory: to
what extent is punishment by one individual crowded out by known punishment choices of
another individual? Our social level question asks whether a lack of crowding out can push
aggregate punishment levels above particular benchmarks.
2.7.1 Main Experiment
In order to answer this question, we ran an experiment on AMT using a sample 476
individuals (mean age = 29.7, 56% male). Participants received a show-up fee of :5 USDChapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 38
and an additional payment depending on their earnings during the game, using a conversion
rate of 1 points per :01 USD.35
We use a game similar to experiment 2 to explore crowding out behavior. Players are
randomly assigned to groups of four and start the game with 100 points. Each individual
is assigned one role: assigner 1, taker, target, or assigner 2.36 All rules of the game are
known to all players before they begin the experiment. Players act sequentially as follows:
assigner 1 commits to a publicly known level of penalty units (0   6), each penalty unit
corresponds to a 10 point sanction. Knowing this level of penalty, the taker decides to take
or not from the target. If the taker choose to take, they gain 30 points, and the target loses
40 points. The taker is found out in 3=4 cases. If the taker is found out, assigner 2 sees the
punishment that assigner 1 chose, and is given a choice to assign an additional number of
penalty units (up to 6). A found out taker is imposed the sum of the penalty units chosen
by the assigner 1 and assigner 2 and both assigners are charged 1 point per 10 points of
sanction they assign.
Again, although the target makes no choice in our game, we ask them to enter what
they think would be a “fair” punishment for a taker who chooses to take. As in experiment
2, individuals see the instructions for the experiment and then take a quiz about the rules.
Individuals who do not answer quiz questions correctly are not allowed to participate in
the experiment. Overall, approximately 70% of participants answered the quiz questions
correctly leaving us with 73 groups of four players.
Ourmainvariableofinterestisassigner2’schoiceinlevelofpunishment. Asinthepre-
vious experiment, we use the strategy method to elicit this preference. Figure 2.6 presents
the average punishment choice of assigner 2, for each possible assigner 1 choices. On av-
erage, there is no difference across assigner 1’s choices, and thus no evidence of crowd-out
behavior on aggregate.
We do ﬁnd considerable heterogeneity in individual behavior. Because we use the strat-
egy method we can look for different behavioral types in our population. Overall, we ﬁnd
35Given the average completion time of our experiment and average bonuses, total payoffs amounted to an
hourly wage of approximately $8   10 per hour.
36In experimental instructions taker and target are referred to as player 1 and player 2 respectively.Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 39
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Figure 2.6: Experiment 3: Assigner 2’s behavior
that approximately 80% of assigner 2’s can be classiﬁed into one of three types: individuals
whose sanction choices decrease in assigner 1’s choice (partial crowd-out types 35%), indi-
viduals whose sanction choices increases in assigner 1’s choice (crowd-in types37 25%) and
individuals whose sanctions do not change as a function of assigner 1’s choice (constant
types, 20%). Individual heterogeneity is not the main focus of this discussion, so we leave
as an avenue for future work. However, we can use this analysis as a robustness check. If
we restrict our analysis to the crowd-out types, we still see an imperfect crowding out of
own punishment by the punishment of another and we can statistically reject the hypothesis
of perfect crowding out even in this restricted subsample (table 2.9).
Wecanalsolookattheaveragebehavioroftheﬁrstassignerinthisexperimentandwhat
the target deems to be a fair punishment. We ﬁnd that the mean punishment assigned by the
ﬁrst assigner is 3:02 units (30 points). Combining this with the conditional punishments of
assigner 2, we ﬁnd that the average total punishment on a taking player is approximately
5 units of punishment, or 50 points. We note that this is 25% higher than the mean ‘fair
37These individuals may be using assigner 1’s decision as a signal of the inappropriateness of taking.Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 40
punishment’ as viewed by the targets (mean fair punishment = 42 points).
2.7.2 Control Experiment
Experiment 3 uses a strategy method and a within subject design to look for the ex-
tent of crowd-out in punishment. We ran a second study as a robustness check using a
between-subject design without the strategy method. We used AMT to recruit subjects,
again dropping those who failed a comprehension quiz. We were left with 243 participants
(mean age = 29, 57 % male) between two conditions.
In our control experiment, players are put into groups of three and assigned a role:
taker, target or assigner. All rules of the game are known to all players before they begin
the experiment. The game proceeds as follows: the taker decides to take or not from the
target. If the taker chose to take, they gain 30 points, and the target loses 40 points. The
taker is found out in 3=4 cases. If the taker is found out, they automatically lose c points,
where c is varied to be 0 or 40 by condition. If the taker is found out, the assigner can
assign up to 6 penalty units, each of which amounts to a 10 point sanction. The assigner is
charged 2 point for every 1 penalty unity.
Thiscontrolletsuslookatcrowd-outeffectswhenpunishmentisassignedbyanoutside
ﬁgure instead of another player in the game. Figure 2.7 shows the average chosen levels of
punishments in the two conditions. Assigner punishment levels chosen are slightly lower
when c = 4 than when c = 0, but this difference is not statistically signiﬁcant, and it is in
any case much smaller than a one-for-one crowding out: punishments are of on average 2
units in the c = 0 condition, and 1:7 in the c = 40 condition. Thus realized sanction are
approximately 20 points in the c = 0 condition and 57 points in the c = 4 condition.
In the interest of space, we skip discussion of taker behavior and fairness evaluations
by the target, as they only replicate the qualitative results of experiments 1 and 2.
This last set of experiments therefore indicates that punishment is not crowded out one
for one by pre-set levels of sanctions. On average, there is no effect of pre-set sanctions on
average punishment. We note that there is considerable heterogeneity in this behavior, but
never observe perfect crowding out.Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 41
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Figure 2.7: Study 2 Control Decisions
2.8 Conclusion
Though many legal scholars and philosophers think of moral reasoning as driven by
rational, calculating processes, the nascent ﬁeld of moral psychology suggests that moral
behaviors, including the punishment of those who break social norms, are mostly driven by
emotional reactions which are then rationalized by conscious processing (Greene and Haidt
(2002), Haidt (2001)). Using such a blunt psychological mechanism motivated by affective
factors and not rational reasoning to make punishment decisions may sometimes collater-
ally result in social harmony, but in other domains can result in either highly inefﬁcient
over punishing or inefﬁcient under punishing. We have presented a simple theory based on
this observation which predicts that punishment decisions will be driven by personal cost,
and not public cost, will not respond to probability of apprehension, as optimal deterrence
might and may not necessarily crowd-out one-for-one as punishment might in a theory of
‘just desserts.’ We conﬁrm these predictions in our experiments and ﬁnd little evidence
that standard rational motives (deterrence, incapacitation) are major drivers of individual
punishment decisions.Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 42
We argue that understanding the role more emotional or automatic mechanisms at play
in choosing levels of punishments could be important in our understanding of many types
of social behaviors including aggregate outcomes in the criminal justice system. We have
presented several possible channels through which we believe our theory of behavior can
affect these aggregate outcomes. More empirical research is needed in understanding to
what extent cold glow motives drive the behaviors of voters, judges and juries, as well as
everyday punishment behaviors in social groups.
Simultaneously with ﬁeld data, further lab experiments could be used to investigate the
mechanisms at play in choosing levels of sanctions. In particular, does feedback on deter-
rence appear to have effects on choices of levels of punishment? Does drawing people’s
attention to the cost of sanctions modify their choices? Does professional training change
the methods of decision-making employed by individuals?
Behavioral and social scientists have increasingly gone beyond studying how aggregate
outcomes come about, and have taken a plunge into the practice of using their skills to to
help design “rules of the game” that achieve normatively desired outcomes.38 We note that,
especially in the case of punishment institutions, it seems that effective rules of the game
will depend on the psychological motivations of the players. This is particularly stark if
we consider the difference in assumptions that individuals punish for public goods motives
(theories of deterrence, incapacitation) or for private beneﬁts (cold glow). In the former
case, punishment will be under provided due to free-riding motivations and so mechanisms
which subsidize the costs of punishment decisions will improve overall efﬁciency. How-
ever, if individuals are motivated by cold glow, the same subsidies may lead to highly in-
efﬁcient outcomes. Economics as “rule design” is a growing and important part of modern
social science and we hope that our results contribute to this important conversation.
38For a survey of recent work in the ﬁeld of market design see Roth (2003).Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 43
Table 2.1: Experiment 1 - Taking behavior, by condition
(1) (2)
No vs. With Sanctions Punishment Cost Structure
1=With Sanctions -0.655
(0.0371)
Public -0.0556
(0.0728)
Constant 0.841 0.219
(0.0256) (0.0625)
Observations 2407 1067
Results clustered at the subject level
+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 2.2: Experiment 1 - Length of punishment, by treatment, across rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All Rounds 6-20 Rounds 1-5
Public 1.818 1.809 2.113 0.990
(0.754) (0.754) (0.771) (0.840)
Round -0.0406
(0.0186)
Constant 1.734 2.166 1.394 2.686
(0.455) (0.530) (0.457) (0.606)
Observations 1067 1067 782 285
Results clustered at the subject level
+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 44
Table 2.3: Experiment 1 - Length of punishment: public motives vs. cost structure
(1) (2) (3)
Public vs. Private Deterrence vs. None Both Effects
Public Costs 0.780 1.818
(0.357) (0.752)
No Deterrence -1.039 -1.039
(0.459) (0.767)
Constant 1.734 3.553 1.734
(0.133) (0.148) (0.454)
Observations 520 691 1139
Results clustered at the subject level
+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 2.4: Experiment 1 - Length of punishment: individual differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public 1.887 1.777 2.317
(0.778) (0.750) (0.823)
Punishment Chosen 0.579 -1.214+ 1.936
(0.640) (0.686) (0.936)
Stolen From -0.369
(0.287)
Low Taker -2.305
(0.806)
Constant 1.437 2.358 2.789 1.896 1.992
(0.640) (0.733) (0.587) (0.515) (0.486)
Observations 1067 448 619 1067 1067
Results clustered at the subject level
Low Taker: took less than 15 times in the no punishment condition
+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 45
Table 2.5: Experiment 2: Choice of punishment type, by treatment
(1) (2) (3)
Punish Level, Full sample Level, if Punish = 1
1 = High -0.131 -0.154 0.584
(0.0799) (0.744) (0.741)
1 = Female -0.0296 -0.788 -0.749
(0.0817) (0.760) (0.753)
Age -0.0000964 0.0140 0.0156
(0.00439) (0.0409) (0.0397)
Constant 0.938 4.121 4.396
(0.139) (1.291) (1.277)
Observations 81 81 69
Standard errors in parentheses
High: found with a 90% chance; Low: found with a 33% chance.
Punish=1 if assigner entered a positive level of punishment.
Level = amount of punishment chosen
+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 46
Table 2.6: Experiment 2: MAPP, by treatment
(1) (2) (3)
Take Level, Full Sample Level, if Take = 1
1 = High 0.109 -0.593 -1.799
(0.0991) (0.722) (0.813)
1 = Female -0.211+ -1.981 -2.109
(0.107) (0.780) (0.921)
Age -0.00490 -0.0428 -0.0645
(0.00573) (0.0417) (0.0506)
Constant 0.862 5.322 7.775
(0.179) (1.307) (1.616)
Observations 82 82 58
Standard errors in parentheses
High: found with a 90% chance; Low: found with a 33% chance.
MAPP = Maximum Acceptable Possible Penalties
Take=1 if taker entered a positive level of acceptable punishment.
Level = amount of acceptable punishment
+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 47
Table 2.7: Experiment 2: Punishment choice, all data pooled (control)
(1) (2)
Extensive: Punish Intensive: Level
1 = High -0.0728 -0.0692
(0.0624) (0.527)
1 = Assigner First 0.0290 0.939+
(0.0616) (0.520)
1 = Female 0.0809 -0.256
(0.0637) (0.538)
Age -0.00542+ -0.0315
(0.00316) (0.0267)
Constant 0.986 4.251
(0.112) (0.944)
Observations 147 147
Standard errors in parentheses
High: found with a 90% chance; Low: found with a 33% chance
+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 48
Table 2.8: Experiment 2: Target’s opinion on fair punishment level, by treatment
(1) (2) (3)
With Deterrence No Deterrence Comparing Conditions
1 = High 0.620 0.180 0.438
(0.715) (0.846) (0.539)
1 = Female -0.186 -0.154 -0.193
(0.817) (0.866) (0.582)
Age -0.0899 -0.0536 -0.0736
(0.0396) (0.0416) (0.0282)
1 = Assigner First -0.758
(0.535)
Constant 6.972 6.947 7.374
(1.190) (1.387) (0.954)
Observations 80 64 144
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 2.9: Experiment 3: 2nd punisher’s choice, by 1st punisher choice
(1) (2)
Full sample Crowding Out
Player 1 sanction -0.0289 -0.569
(0.0620) (0.0585)
Constant 2.199 3.380
(0.237) (0.363)
Observations 553 196
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 49
2.9 Summary of Experiments
Table 2.10: Summary of experiments
Experiment Conditions Hypotheses tested
Experiment 1 Private costs of punishment Role of private costs
Cost Structures Public costs of punishment vs. public costs
One Round Take No social motives
Experiment 2 Ex-ante vs. ex-post Effects of probability of capture
Probabilities p = :33 vs. p = :9 Ex-ante vs. ex-post behavior
Experiment 3 2 assigners Crowding out behavior
Multiple punishers Computer + assigner
2.10 Summary Predictions, Experiment 1
Table 2.11: Experiment 1: Behaviors Predicted by Various Punishment Theories
Punishment Motive Result
Incapacitation Public Punishment = 0
One Round Take = 0
General Deterrence Public Punishment = 0
Private Punishment = 0
One Round Take =0
Speciﬁc Deterrence Punishment decreases in rounds
One Round Take =0
Cold Glow Public Punishment > Private Punishment
One Round Take > 0Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 50
2.11 A Mathematical Model of Speciﬁc Deterrence
The theory of speciﬁc deterrence which we will model here is as follows: individ-
uals start with a propensity to choose take in every round, each individual has a type
 2 [0;max] and a threshold level of punishment that depends on his type. The proba-
bility distribution over types is given by p 2 ([0;max]) and is smooth and well behaved
with density f that has strictly negative ﬁrst derivative (that is, higher types are rarer).
If an individual of type  receives a punishment of size at least ; he ‘learns his lesson’
and never takes again. If he receives a punishment of size less than  he continues to take
in all rounds after.
To formalize our theory we consider a group of N honest individuals with one indi-
vidual i who has been found out for taking and follows the behavioral rule outlined above,
there are k rounds left in the game. We consider a benevolent social planner who does not
know the type  of the taking individual. The social planner wants to maximize the mon-
etary rewards that will accrue to honest individuals. We now ask, given such assumptions,
what can we say about the optimal punishment strategy? For simplicity, we suppose that
punishments can be delivered in continuous amounts c 2 [0;1) and has a social cost of v
per unit to make the math easier.
Proposition 3. There exists a unique optimal punishment level c which is given by the ﬁrst
order condition:
3f(c
)k = v:
c is decreasing in both number of rounds left and public cost of punishment.
The intuition for the ﬁrst-order condition is as follows: by marginally increasing c the
social planner increases the probability that the individual in question learns their lesson
from the punishment. The marginal beneﬁt of this is exactly 3 units times the number of
rounds left. The marginal cost is exactly v: When there are less rounds left, the marginal
beneﬁt is lower so optimal punishments are lower. The exact solutions, however, depend
on assumptions about the distribution of types.Chapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 51
2.12 Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. The utility function P maximizes is
 sP + (sP;sT)
the ﬁrst order conditions of the maximization are simply
 =
(s b (;sT);sT)
@sP
which by assumption are unique ( is concave in sP) and give us the comparative statics
directly.
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall that we can write P’s maximization problem as:
 (sP;q)[q((sP;T)   sP) + (1   q)((0;T))] + (1    (sP;q))(0;0):
We can set (0;0) to be 0 and drop the dependence of  on the second argument to save
notation. Our maximization becomes
 (sP;q)[q((sP)   sP) + (1   q)((0))]:
Note that if we take the derivative we get
 
0(sP;q)[q((sP)   sP)   (1   q)((0)] +  (sP;q)[q(
@
@sP
  )]:
The ﬁrst term is positive because  0 is negative and the quantity in parentheses which it
multiplies is negative from the assumption that (sP) > 0:
Now, consider the ex-post problem with the same : The answer to this problem is
given s that sets
 =
@
@sP
this means that for s < s we have that the second term must be also positive and hence the
overall utility only increases for s 2 [0;s] so any maximizer of the ex-ante problem must
be above the maximizer of the ex-post problem. Additionally, we may have that the orig-
inal maximization problem has several local maxima (and hence we cannot, without moreChapter 2: Cold Glow and Punishment Decisions 52
conditions, describe the maximum using derivatives), however it is a continuous function
on a convex set so it will generically have one global maximum which is, by the argument
above, guaranteed to lie about s:Chapter 3
Ambiguity, Information and Valuation
3.1 Brief Summary
We use ambiguous ﬁnancial gambles to explore how information affects individual de-
cisions. In the domain of gains, we ﬁnd that information that suggests that a gain is more
likely increases individual willingness to pay (WTP) for the gamble as well as their conﬁ-
dence. In contrast, information that suggests a gain is less likely has a much smaller effect
on both WTP and conﬁdence. We ﬁnd a similar imbalance in the domain of losses: infor-
mation which suggests a loss is less likely inﬂuences behavior much more than information
which suggests a loss is more likely. We show that two mechanisms appear to drive this ef-
fect: a bias towards integration of favorable information as well as an “unshrouding” effect
in which unfavorable information has a component which has a positive effect on WTP:
removing a part of ambiguity from the decision problem.
3.2 Introduction
Most decisions in the real world, whether they are the decisions made by a trader to
buy a stock or an individual deciding whether to visit a particular restaurant have outcomes
which are only probabilistically known. Decisions in this domain have been characterized
using two dimensions: risk, or the probability of a given outcome, and ambiguity, the avail-
abilityorunavailabilityofnecessaryinformationtomaketheseriskestimates. Beyondtheir
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response to risky situations, individuals tend to be ambiguity averse (Ellsberg (1961), Fox
and Tversky (1995)). Much is known about how individuals respond to changes in risk lev-
els (Roth and Kagel (1995), Kahneman and Tversky (2000)). However much less is known
about how addition of information affects ambiguous decisions.1 Given the prevalence of
ambiguity, answering this question is a major component of understanding and predict-
ing important human behaviors (Knight (1921), Epstein and Schneider (2008), Ritov and
Baron (1990)). Here we report a series of experiments studying the effects of information
on ambiguous decisions using ﬁnancial gambles.
Traditional experiments on ambiguity aversion are modeled on what has come to be
known as the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg (1961)). In these experiments, participants are
presented with a bag containing 100 poker chips, all of which are either red or blue. They
are then asked for their willingness to pay (WTP) to play a game in which they guess
the color of a chip drawn from the bag at random. Players win a monetary reward if the
color of the drawn chip matches their guess, but receive nothing if it doesn’t. On average
individuals are willing to pay more when they know the bag contains exactly 50 red and
50 blue poker chips (no ambiguity) than when they know nothing about the bag’s contents
(complete ambiguity). This occurs even though they maintain the same risk estimate for
a chip of their color being drawn which contradicts the predictions of subjective expected
utility models.
We extended this design to investigate how information inﬂuences the evaluation of
ambiguous situations. In a series of experiments participants were asked to indicate their
WTP for tickets to play several iterations of one of two types of games. In “pull-a-chip”
games a poker chip was randomly drawn from a bag containing 100 red and blue colored
chips. A red chip resulted in a winning outcome with a (hypothetical) monetary payout.
In “majority” games a bag was ﬁlled with 101 poker chips and participants won if 51 or
more of the chips in the bag were red. Note that in the majority game, but not in the
pull-a-chip game, perfect knowledge of a bag’s contents guarantees knowledge of whether
1There is much experimental work on behavioral foundations of ambiguity aversion (Halevy (2007) is
a recent example and Camerer and Weber (1992) provides a survey of the older literature) but, to the best
of our knowledge, none that considers anything similar to the information variation done in the experiments
reported here.Chapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 55
the outcome would be a win or loss. Thus, the majority game involves only ambiguity
whereas the pull-a-chip game involves ambiguity together with risk. In our experiments,
in addition to reporting their WTP, participants were asked to rate how conﬁdent they were
that a winning chip would be drawn, or that the winning color would be the majority color
on 7-point Likert scales.
For each bag, participants were given partial information about its contents in the form
of the following statement: “This bag contains at least X red chips and at least Y blue
chips.” X and Y were varied parametrically from 0 to 50 in increments of 25, thus creat-
ing 9 possible levels of knowledge, or rounds, for each game. Across both hypothetical
and incentivized experiments we found that favorable information (increases in number of
known winning chips) increased WTP and conﬁdence while unfavorable information (in-
creases in number of known non-winning chips) had a signiﬁcantly smaller effect on WTP
and conﬁdence.2
Additionally, in order to see whether our effect persisted in contexts where informa-
tion could be interpreted more subjectively, participants played iterations of another game
which was based on evaluating trivia. In these games, participants indicated their WTP for
gambles dependent on trivia about categories such as sports, geography, ﬁnance, weather
and knowledge of cities. Participants won a monetary payout if the trivia item in question
was true and received nothing if it was false. Participants were also randomly assigned 0,
1 or 2 facts pertaining to the trivia and made their WTP decisions in the presence of all this
information. After indicating their WTP, participants also evaluated the facts assigned to
them, giving a subjective assessment of whether each fact was favorable (“this fact makes
me think the trivia is more likely to be true”), unfavorable (“this fact makes me think the
trivia is less likely to be true”), or neutral (“this fact has no effect on my estimate”). Just
as in our poker chip games, favorable information increased WTP while unfavorable infor-
mation had a much smaller effect.
While this series of experiments demonstrate a strong and consistent bias in ambiguous
situations involving gains, it is less clear how such a bias might translate to ambiguous
2Magnitude levels of unfavorable effects relative to favorable effects varied between 0% and 30% depend-
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situations where the outcome reﬂects avoiding or minimizing a loss. To address this, we
conducted an additional (hypothetical) experiment in the domain of losses. Participants
started with a speciﬁc endowment and a bag with 100 poker chips. A chip would be drawn
at random and their endowment would be lost if a red chip were drawn, but retained if a
blue chip were drawn. Participants were asked to enter their WTP for an insurance ticket
which would protect their endowment if a red chip were drawn. We found that an increase
innumberofno-losschipssigniﬁcantlydecreasedWTPforinsurance, butknowledgeabout
the number of loss chips had no signiﬁcant effect.
Our ﬁnal series of analyses look at what psychological mechanisms drive this asymme-
try. First, we recruited individuals to simply rate the trivia statements from experiment 2 as
being favorable or unfavorable without the addition of any sort of gamble incentive. This
let us classify trivia facts as ‘objectively favorable’ or ‘objectively unfavorable.’ We found
that participants in the trivia gambling experiments agree with the third party ratings 75%
of the time when the ratings are objectively favorable but only 50% of the time when the
ratings are objectively unfavorable. This provides a hint of biased integration.
The difference between completely ambiguous and risk only situations has sometimes
been discussed to be caused by relative ignorance (Fox and Tversky (1995)). That is, am-
biguous gambles are aversive (and thus are valued less than subjectively equivalently risky
ones) because they involve a negative affective component caused by lack of knowledge.
In the language of a Bayesian model, this can be framed as individuals not simply caring
about the ‘point estimate’ of their prior but also about something like its entropy.3 Because
of this, there is another channel by which our asymmetric effect may arise: each piece of
information has two effects, it changes point estimates and it decreases entropy. For favor-
able information, both of these effects go in the same direction (both positive) while for
unfavorable information one effect is negative (decrease in point estimate) but the other is
positive (decrease in entropy).
To see if such an effect existed, we ran a ﬁnal experiment in which individuals were
presented with our pull-a-chip gambles but were now asked to indicate three things: their
3Indeed recent neuroscientiﬁc (Hsu et al. (2005), Huettel et al. (2006)) studies seem to bear out the idea
that ambiguous and purely risky situations are fundamentally different.Chapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 57
WTP, their ‘subjective estimate’ that a red or blue chip would be drawn (i.e. their point
estimate) and their subjective feeling of how ‘accurate’ their subjective estimate is (i.e. the
entropy of their prior). We show that individual WTP can be broken down into a combina-
tion of point estimate minus entropy. Additionally we show that the effects of information
are of expected directions: favorable information increases likelihood estimates and in-
creases subjective accuracy while unfavorable information decreases likelihood estimates
but also increases subjective accuracy. We ﬁnd some evidence of a bias in integration
towards favorable information as well.
We now turn to describing our experiments and results. First we describe experiment
1 and show our main behavioral effect. We then discuss three controls. We then replicate
our effects in an incentive compatible environment (experiment 2, part 1) as well as in our
trivia paradigm (experiment 2, part 2). Finally, we show that our effect also holds in a loss
frame. We then discuss possible mechanisms driving our effect and conclude with a brief
sketch of theoretical implications.
3.3 General Methods
As many of our experiments use the same stimuli, we discuss the construction of them
here for simplicity.
To produce ‘rounds’ for each of our experiments, we combined a game type (pull-a-
chip: 100 poker chips, red or blue, winning condition = one chip drawn at random matches
your assigned color; majority: 101 poker chips, red or blue, winning condition = majority
color of bag matches your assigned color) with a knowledge level or a statement of the form
“This bag contains at least X red chips and at least Y blue chips.” X and Y were varied
parametrically from 0 to 50 in increments of 25 to create 9 different knowledge levels (table
3.1).
Some of our experiments use participants recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(AMT) while others take place at the Harvard Decision Science Lab, we discuss this in
the methods section of each experiment. In experiments which used AMT, the knowledge
levels were given in the sentence above. In lab experiments, individuals saw both the verbalChapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 58
description as well as a pictorial representation (see online Appendix for sample stimuli).
We note that our experiments differ from some traditional experiments in that winning
colors are assigned and not chosen by participants – this is done so that we can observe
behavior when unfavorable information is in the majority. A control experiment which
allows choice shows our results are not artifacts of this particular design change.
Table 3.1: Knowledge levels used in experiments
No information At least 25 red At least 50 red
At least 25 blue At least 25 red At least 50 red
At least 25 blue At least 25 blue
At least 50 blue At least 25 red At least 50 red
At least 50 blue At least 50 blue
In all experiments, after providing informed consent in accordance with the IRB stan-
dards of the supporting university, participants indicated basic demographic information
(age, gender). In addition, participants recruited from AMT completed attention checks
that including copying text into a response box as well as answering basic questions about
the rules of the experiment (eg. “In the game, how many poker chips are in each of the
bags?”)
3.4 Experiment 1: Main Study
3.4.1 Methods
Two hundred and ﬁfty-six participants (48 % male, mean age = 31.48) recruited via
AMT participated in this study for monetary compensation. Participants were paid 30 cents
for “playing hypothetical lottery games.” Out of the full set, forty-ﬁve participants (17 %)
were unable to successfully complete one of the attention checks, and were removed from
the analysis, leaving a sample size of n = 215.
This experiment used a joint evaluation design and prior testing revealed that includ-
ing too many rounds on a single page was confusing. In this experiment each participant
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design was constructed as follows: participants were randomly assigned into one of six
conditions ( 37 participants per condition) in a between-subject design by combining a
game type (pull-a-chip vs. majority) with a subset of these bags. In majority games, partic-
ipants were asked to imagine ﬁve bags (labeled as Bags A through E), each ﬁlled with 101
poker chips colored red or blue. In pull-a-chip games, participants were asked to imagine
ﬁve bags (labeled Bags A through E), each ﬁlled with 100 poker chips colored red or blue.
Participants were given varying amounts of information about the speciﬁc composition of
the chips in each bag. Table 3.2 shows the possible bag sets. Note that these bag sets
combined with game types include all 18 possible levels of knowledge.
Table 3.2: Possible bag sets
Set 1 Set 1 Set 3
Bag A contains ... 50 red, 50 blue 50 red, 50 blue 50 red, 50 blue
Bag B contains ... 25 red, 25 blue 25 red, 25 blue 25 red, 25 blue
Bag C contains ... 25 red 50 red 25 red, 50 blue
Bag D contains ... 25 blue 50 blue 50 red, 25 blue
Bag E contains ... unknown unknown unknown
Participants were asked to enter their hypothetical WTP for a ticket to play pull-a-chip
games or majority games in each condition for a prize of $50. Participants indicated this
WTP for each of the ﬁve bags by moving sliders on a scale that ranged from $0 to $35.
Afterwards on a separate screen, they reported how conﬁdent they felt that a red chip would
be drawn on a scale of 1(Not Very Conﬁdent) to 7(Very Conﬁdent).4
3.4.2 Results
This design contained a test of the original Ellsberg paradox. Consistent with existing
resultsaverageWTPwaslowerforapull-a-chipbagwithnocolorcompositioninformation
given (mean = 6.31) compared to a pull-a-chip bag with a known composition of 50 red
chips and 50 blue chips (mean = 13.37). This difference was highly signiﬁcant (t-stat =
-6.02, p < :001).
4The question used, for each bag, was: “How conﬁdent do you feel that a red chip will be drawn (red will
be the majority color) in this bag?”Chapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 60
Figure 3.1 shows WTP pooled across games for each possible knowledge level. At ﬁrst
glance, the impacts of favorable and unfavorable information seems to be highly different:
favorable information seems to increase WTP while unfavorable information seems to have
a much smaller effect.
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Figure 3.1: Experiment 1 WTP by knowledge levels
To analyze our data, we used linear regression. In all reported regressions standard
errors are clustered at the participant level to take account for intraindividual correlations
in WTP.
Toformourbasespeciﬁcation, wepooleddatafromallgamesandknowledgelevelsand
regressed willingness to pay (WTP) on numred (number of red chips, the winning color),
numblue (the number of blue chips, the non-winning color). Column 1 of table 3.3 shows
our main results, both the effects of favorable and unfavorable information are signiﬁcantChapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 61
however the magnitude of the effect of unfavorable information is approximately 13% of
the effect of favorable information. A Wald test rejects equality of the absolute values of
the two coefﬁcients at a level of p < :01 – thus favorable information has a much larger
effect on WTP than unfavorable information.
In robustness checks we included a dummy variable for the game type (column 3), as
well as interactions between the game type and numred and numblue. In our third speci-
ﬁcation, we added age and gender as regressors as well as gender interacted with numred
and numblue (column 3). We control for these variables as there is existing evidence that
men and women differ in their risk preferences (Borghans et al. (2009)) and that risk pref-
erences also differ by age (Tymula et al. (2012)). Finally we used a Tobit model (column 4)
to make sure that our results were robust to censoring. Our main effect is robust across all
speciﬁcations. One additional ﬁnding of note is that men appear to respond more favorably
than women to positive information when evaluating WTP. This is consistent with evidence
that men tend to be less risk averse than women, however, no further interpretation of this
result is possible given this experimental design.
Tables 3.15 and 3.14 in the Appendix show the same regressions independently per-
formed on majority games and pull-a-chip games respectively. These regressions replicate
our primary ﬁnding and are robust to including subject ﬁxed effects (column 4). This anal-
ysis also indicates that the negative effect of unfavorable information is driven speciﬁcally
by majority games (a ﬁnding which is replicated in our later lab experiment).
These regressions used continuous variables to represent the number of chips. This
facilitates interpretation of regression coefﬁcients. Speciﬁcally the coefﬁcient on favorable
is the average marginal effect of an extra piece of favorable information, and similarly for
the coefﬁcient on unfavorable.
We also replicated the analysis using a factor model (Table 3.4). We regressed WTP on
dummy variables for numred = 25, numred = 50, numblue = 25, numblue = 50 (column 1).
As robustness checks we included interactions of these dummies (column 2), the addition
of game-type (column 3), gender and age (column 4) and a Tobit to check for censoring
(column 5).
Our main claim, that favorable and unfavorable information have asymmetric effects,
is robust to this analysis. However, we note effects of favorable information seem to beChapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 62
Table 3.3: Experiment 1: WTP on continuous variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wtp wtp wtp Tobit
numred 0.161 0.169 0.122 0.143
(0.0141) (0.0207) (0.0237) (0.0257)
numblue -0.0210 -0.0390 -0.0257+ -0.0310+
(0.00892) (0.0129) (0.0144) (0.0167)
pull -1.279 -1.385 -1.283
(0.971) (0.971) (1.097)
pullXred -0.0118 -0.00310 0.00166
(0.0279) (0.0277) (0.0305)
pullXblue 0.0373 0.0327+ 0.0319
(0.0178) (0.0176) (0.0203)
gender 3.957 2.481 2.993
(0.960) (0.986) (1.115)
age -0.0613 -0.0613 -0.0690
(0.0457) (0.0458) (0.0494)
genderXred 0.0768 0.0714
(0.0270) (0.0296)
genderXblue -0.0195 -0.0231
(0.0173) (0.0200)
Constant 6.703 7.044 7.929 7.064
(0.496) (1.659) (1.643) (1.765)
Observations 1075 1075 1075 1075
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level
+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01Chapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 63
convex as the coefﬁcient on favorable = 50 is more than twice the size of the coefﬁcient
on favorable = 25. We also note that the effect of unfavorable information seems to be
non-linear as the addition of a small amount of unfavorable information (unfavorable = 25)
seems to increase WTP while the addition of a large amount (unfavorable = 50) seems to
decrease WTP, though again, this effect is much smaller in magnitude than positive effect
of favorable.
Given that in our main discussion is about average treatment effects (that is, average
marginal effects of favorable/unfavorable info), we report continuous regressions for our
three controls from here forward. We will return to the topic of convexity when discussing
the results of experiments 2 and 3.
We performed the same regression analyses for conﬁdence ratings and again ﬁnd that
favorable information has a much stronger effect than unfavorable information (see table
3.16 in appendix). As there is no main effect of game or interaction effects, we do not
report regressions on conﬁdence separated by game type. In addition, we ﬁnd no qualitative
difference in the effects of information between different bag sets.
3.5 Experiment 1: Choice Control
We also note that our design differs from several prior experiments on ambiguity aver-
sion in which the winning color is pre-assigned. We performed an additional control study
in which participants still indicated their WTP, but could choose the winning color of their
ticket.
3.5.1 Methods
One hundred and sixty-six individuals (66% male, mean age = 28.47 s.d. = .748) re-
cruited via AMT participated in this study for monetary compensation. Eight participants
were unable to complete our attention check and were removed from the analysis leaving a
sample size of n=158.
Participants were assigned into one of two conditions, pull-a-chip (n=79) or majority
(n=79) and presented with hypothetical bags of poker chips as well as partial informa-Chapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 64
Table 3.4: Experiment 1 WTP using factor model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wtp wtp wtp Tobit
numred=25 1.359 1.773 1.845 2.177
(0.521) (0.714) (0.699) (0.779)
numred=50 8.228 8.677 8.539 9.602
(0.708) (1.241) (1.195) (1.334)
numblue=25 1.752 1.583 1.295 1.228
(0.490) (1.061) (1.056) (1.261)
numblue=50 -1.566 -0.350 -0.488 -0.926
(0.447) (0.851) (0.862) (1.056)
numred=25 X numblue=25 0.387 0.392 0.648
(1.293) (1.262) (1.442)
numred=25 X numblue=50 -2.646 -2.153+ -2.394
(1.219) (1.236) (1.491)
numred=50 X numblue=25 -0.497 0.355 0.454
(2.147) (2.079) (2.318)
numred=50 X numblue=50 -1.405 -1.130 -0.935
(1.523) (1.452) (1.610)
pull -1.072 -0.725 -0.626
(0.969) (0.930) (1.038)
gender 3.830 4.271
(0.967) (1.070)
age -0.0630 -0.0743
(0.0456) (0.0500)
Constant 7.087 7.398 7.134 6.487
(0.479) (0.732) (1.707) (1.847)
Observations 1075 1075 1075 1075
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level
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tion about their contents similar to the conditions in experiment 1 in a joint evaluation
paradigm.. We only chose a subset of conditions for this control: (R = 50;B = 50);(R =
50;B = 0);(R = 25;B = 25);(R = 0;B = 0) for pull-a-chip games and (R = 50;B =
50);(R = 50;B = 0);(R = 25;B = 25);(R = 25;B = 0);(R = 0;B = 0) for majority
games.5
For each bag, participants chose the color that deﬁned a winning outcome and entered
their WTP. Participants also indicated their conﬁdence in winning the game on 7 point
Likert scale.
3.5.2 Results
Based on the participants’ choice of winning color we regressed their WTP for a ticket
to that game on the number of chips of the same color (favorable) and number of chips
of the non-winning color (unfavorable). We used the same regression speciﬁcations as in
experiment 1.
Table 3.5 shows the results using willingness to pay as the dependent variable, and ta-
ble 3.17 shows the same results using conﬁdence ratings as the dependent variable. Our
analysis shows that favorable information has a signiﬁcant effect on both WTP and conﬁ-
dence, while the effect of unfavorable information has a negligible effect. This replicates
the ﬁndings in experiment 1, and suggests that our effects are not inﬂuenced by whether
individuals can choose the winning color themselves. Table 3.17 in the appendix shows the
same regressions for conﬁdence levels, again, replicating the main study effects.
We also note that participants seem to use the information to make their choices: when
participants have symmetric knowledge (that is, they know that the bag contains at least X
red and at least Y blue chips and X = Y ) they choose red as their winning color 53% of
the time (not statistically different from 50%). When X > Y they choose red 66% of the
time (statistically different from 50%) and when X = 50 and Y = 0 they choose red 86%
of the time (again, statistically different from 50%).
5The reason for these choices is actually a chronological one, we ran the control ﬁrst, found results with
choice and decided to expand that to what later became experiment 1 with the assigned colors.Chapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 66
Table 3.5: Experiment 1 (with choice): WTP on continuous variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wtp wtp wtp wtp
chosencolor 0.114 0.0901 0.0684 0.0779
(0.0141) (0.0234) (0.0293) (0.0317)
othercolor 0.00314 -0.0149 -0.0178 -0.0119
(0.0126) (0.0177) (0.0199) (0.0201)
pull 0.447 0.372 0.214
(1.046) (1.050) (1.154)
pullXchosen 0.0384 0.0412 0.0465
(0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0301)
pullXother 0.0499 0.0507 0.0537
(0.0241) (0.0242) (0.0246)
gender 4.451 3.618 3.910
(1.017) (0.992) (1.139)
age -0.0455 -0.0461 -0.0435
(0.0613) (0.0613) (0.0640)
genderXchosen 0.0301 0.0288
(0.0278) (0.0299)
genderXother 0.00350 0.000757
(0.0215) (0.0215)
Constant 6.935 5.095 5.705 4.753
(0.556) (2.166) (2.102) (2.275)
Observations 711 711 711 711
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level
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3.6 Experiment 2: Incentive Compatible
Up to this point, our results have reﬂected responses to hypothetical gambles. Since
decisionswithreal consequencesaremorerepresentativeofdaily decision-making, andcan
elicit stronger reactions than hypothetical scenarios we conducted an incentive compatible
experiment. Thirty-seven undergraduate students participated in a lab-based study using
the same set of games and possible knowledge levels as in experiment 1 in a within-subject
design using real monetary outcomes. The experiment consisted of two semi-independent
parts, each subdivided into rounds. To keep exposition ﬂowing, we will ﬁrst discuss the
methods and results of part 1, then move to part 2.
3.6.1 Poker Chips (Incentive Compatible Control)
In each round of part 1, participants entered their WTP for pull-a-chip or majority
games from bags of poker chips about which they received partial information. Just as in
experiment 1, winning colors were assigned, however in this experiment the winning color
(red or blue) was randomly assigned for each round and participants were informed of this.
Each participant made a total of 18 choices (9 levels of knowledge x 2 types of games)
in part 1. The rounds were presented in random order with the following exception: the ﬁrst
evaluation for all participants was the pull-a-chip bag with no information and their second
evaluation was the pull-a-chip bag whose contents were known to be 50 red chips and 50
blue chips. Additionally, participants were asked for their conﬁdence that they would win
each game using the same 1 to 7 scale as experiment 1. The Appendix includes instructions
and sample stimuli.
A version of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure was used to aid in elic-
itation of true WTP (Becker et al. (1964)). Participants were given an endowment at the
start of each round and had their WTP compared with a price randomly generated by the
computer. If the computer’s price was higher than their stated WTP, they retained the full
endowment for that round. If the computers price was lower, they bought the ticket out
of their endowment for that price. The BDM was (painstakingly) explained to participants
along with a demonstration of the optimal strategy. We note that since most of our study’sChapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 68
power comes from the 18 within-subject questions and what is at stake are changes rather
than levels common misunderstandings of the BDM (for example, subjects treating it as
a ﬁrst price auction and consequently shading all bids by a percentage) will not bias our
results.
To prevent “portfolio building” only one round of the experiment (that is, from com-
bined rounds in both part 1 and part 2) was chosen to count for real money and was actually
played out at the end of the experiment. This involved conducting the BDM procedure and
determining or revealing the outcome of the round. No deception was used and all 18 actual
bags of poker chips described in the experiment were shown to subjects before they began.
Our data is again consistent with standard tests of ambiguity aversion: WTP for a pull-
a-chip bag with no information (M = 6.27 s.d. = .88) was signiﬁcantly lower than that for a
pull-a-chip bag with a known composition of 50 red and 50 blue chip (M = 10.40 sd = .86;
t-test p < :001).
In our base regression (table 3.6) we regressed WTP on numgood (number of favor-
able known chips) and (number of unfavorable known chips) and replicated the qualitative
ﬁndings of experiment 1. The absolute magnitude of the coefﬁcient on unfavorable infor-
mation was approximately 30% that of the coefﬁcient on favorable information. A Wald
test rejects equality of these coefﬁcients at p < :01:
A second regression included a variable indicating the type of game as well as inter-
actions of numgood and numbad with this dummy (column 2). This speciﬁcation reveals
that the signiﬁcant negative effect of conﬂicting information is primarily driven by majority
games, as the coefﬁcients on the interaction term pullXbad is signiﬁcant and of the same
magnitude as the negative coefﬁcient on numbad.6 We also include gender, age and gender
interacted with information types (column 3) as well as subject level ﬁxed effects (column
4). Finally, we use to a Tobit regression to show our effects are not driven by censoring
(column 5). We note that we ﬁnd no gender effects here unlike in experiment 1. We also
did the same analysis for conﬁdence ratings (table 3.20 in appendix) which replicate the
results of experiment 1.
6We can also disaggregate the WTP behavior by game type. Table 3.19 and 3.18 in the Appendix show
the same regressions for pull-a-chip and majority games separately. All of these effects can be seen in the
separate regressions as well.Chapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 69
Table 3.6: Experiment 2 (Poker Chips): WTP on continuous variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
wtp wtp wtp (with FE) Tobit
numgood 0.117 0.136 0.118 0.135 0.137
(0.0123) (0.0147) (0.0169) (0.0152) (0.0189)
numbad -0.0352 -0.0581 -0.0471 -0.0585 -0.0542
(0.00998) (0.0143) (0.0141) (0.0147) (0.0174)
pull -0.142 -0.142 -0.153 0.132
(0.529) (0.532) (0.545) (0.650)
pullXgood -0.0363 -0.0363 -0.0360 -0.0485
(0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0146) (0.0169)
pullXbad 0.0459 0.0459 0.0462 0.0572
(0.0136) (0.0137) (0.0140) (0.0171)
ismale -1.170 -1.555
(1.439) (1.770)
age 0.172 0.209
(0.214) (0.235)
maleXgood 0.0451+ 0.0599+
(0.0251) (0.0310)
maleXbad -0.0292 -0.0401
(0.0219) (0.0265)
Constant 6.432 6.504 3.205 6.517 1.690
(0.640) (0.739) (4.586) (0.455) (5.032)
sigma
Constant 5.948
(0.274)
Observations 665 665 665 665 665
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level.
+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01Chapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 70
We can also consider a factor analysis as in experiment 1. We regress WTP on dum-
mies for favorable=25, favorable=50, unfavorable=25, unfavorable = 50 as well as other
control variables (table 3.7). We now ﬁnd much stronger convexity in our results than in
experiment 1: the addition of a small amount of favorable information (25) seems to have
either no effect or a very small positive effect, while the addition of a lot of favorable infor-
mation (50) seems to have a much larger effect. Again, unfavorable information seems to
be non-monotonic as a small amount of unfavorable information seems to increase WTP
while a larger amount seems to decrease it (relative to having no unfavorable information).
We do not speculate on the causes of this,7 we note that while this is not a problem for
our main argument which is that favorable and unfavorable information affect decisions
quite differently. Favorable information seems to increase WTP (though perhaps convexly)
while unfavorable information seems to do all sorts of weird things. Even dropping the
intermediate conditions (favorable=25, unfavorable=25) so that we restrict to conditions
where both effects are in the expected direction, the effect of favorable information seems
to be much stronger than the countervailing force of unfavorable information.
3.6.2 Trivia Questions
In part 2, individuals saw 10 pieces of trivia in a random order. For each trivia item, they
were randomly assigned to see either 0,1 or 2 related facts (see sample stimuli for example,
the Appendix lists both the trivia items and possible associated facts). Participants were
informed of the following rules: if the trivia statement was true, they would win additional
money, if it was false, they would win nothing. After indicating WTP, participants were
asked to indicate their conﬁdence that they would win on a scale of 1 to 7 as well as how
knowledgeable they felt about the topic of the trivia question on a scale of 1 (Not very
knowledgeable) to 7 (Extremely knowledgeable).
Each trivia question was in the form of a ‘less than’ or ‘more than’ statement and we
7In future research we plan to explore the non-monotonicities in unfavorable information, however our
current experimental designs are simply not set up to make any conclusive statements about possible causes
of this non-monotonicity (and why convexity seems to be different between hypothetical and incentive-
compatible designs) or even to look at it more in depth. Any explanations given here would really be post-hoc
rationalizations of our data, not exactly appropriate for a study which looks at a form of conﬁrmation bias.Chapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 71
Table 3.7: Experiment 2 (Poker Chips): WTP with factor model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wtp wtp (with FE) Tobit
numgood=25 -0.0270 0.757 0.757 1.337
(0.519) (0.631) (0.648) (0.843)
numgood=50 5.874 7.284 7.284 8.262
(0.614) (0.954) (0.981) (1.161)
numbad=25 0.779+ 1.757 1.757 2.319
(0.393) (0.736) (0.757) (0.888)
numbad=50 -1.757 -0.541 -0.541 -0.674
(0.500) (1.010) (1.038) (1.270)
numgood=25 X numbad=25 -1.041 -1.041 -1.552
(0.899) (0.924) (1.072)
numgood=25 X numbad=50 -1.311 -1.311 -1.451
(1.012) (1.040) (1.280)
numgood=50 X numbad=25 -1.892+ -1.892+ -2.455
(1.053) (1.083) (1.220)
numgood=50 X numbad=50 -2.342+ -2.369+ -2.426+
(1.225) (1.255) (1.467)
pull 0.0970 0.103 0.300
(0.260) (0.266) (0.305)
ismale -0.582
(1.085)
Constant 6.866 6.307 6.086 5.094
(0.645) (0.940) (0.632) (1.092)
Observations 665 665 665 665
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level.
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randomized the ‘direction’ (‘less than’ or ‘more than’) of each trivia question at the group
level and participants were informed of this fact in the instructions. This was done so that
participants did not feel that they were being asked ‘trick questions.’
When participants received additional facts along with their trivia, they were also asked
to categorize those facts as favorable (“This fact makes me think that it is more likely that
the trivia is true”), unfavorable (“This fact makes me think that is it less likely that the
trivia is true”) or neutral (“This fact does not help me make any judgment on the trivia”).
Approximately 65 % of facts are rated as non-neutral. Figure 3.2 shows the average WTP
collapsed across questions by subjectively reported knowledge level.
Regression analysis for the trivia pooled all 10 questions (table 3.8). In our base spec-
iﬁcation, we regressed WTP on a dummy variable (subjgood) that takes value 1 if the par-
ticipant indicated the presence of favorable information and a second dummy variable that
takes value 1 if the participant indicated the presence of unfavorable information (subjbad).
Both have signiﬁcant and robust effects in the correct directions.
However, the relative magnitudes of the point estimates of unfavorable information is at
best approximately 30% that of the coefﬁcient on favorable information and their absolute
magnitudes are signiﬁcantly different (p < :01, Wald test). This is a strong test of biased
integration as the information valence is identiﬁed by the subjects themselves. Thus even
when subjects say that a fact makes the trivia item less likely to be true, they do not appear
to signiﬁcantly change their valuations to reﬂect this assessment.
Robustness checks included controls for self reported knowledgeability of the topic,
gender and gender interacted with types of information (column 2) as well a speciﬁcation
that also included ﬁxed effects for each trivia question (column 3). Finally we used a
Tobit regression (column 4) to see that our results were not driven by censoring. The same
regressions for conﬁdence levels can be found in the appendix (table 3.21).
3.7 Experiment 3: Losses
While this series of experiments demonstrate a strong and consistent bias in ambiguous
situations involving gains, it is less clear how such a bias might translate to ambiguous situ-Chapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 73
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Figure 3.2: Experiment 2 (Trivia) WTP by knowledge levels
ations where the outcome reﬂects avoiding or minimizing a loss. We have been discussing
this effect in terms of favorable or unfavorable information, however a behaviorally equiva-
lenthypothesiscouldbethatindividualsaresimplemuchworseatincorporatingconﬂicting
information about a salient hypothesis than conﬁrming information.8
Thus if participants are simply evaluating a salient hypothesis, we conjecture that in a
8There is much psychological research on ‘unmotivated’ conﬁrmation bias, for example in the famous
Wason card task individuals are presented with 4 double sided cards. One side of each card has a color, the
other side has number. Two cards are presented color up (red and brown) and the other two are presented
number up (1 and 4). Participants are asked to turn over the minimal number of cards to test the hypothesis:
“All cards with an even number on one face, have red on the other.” Most participants correctly turn over
the 4 but do not turn over the brown card (usually, they check the red card, however ﬁnding an odd number
on the back of a red card does not tell us anything about the veracity of the original hypothesis). This task
is a speciﬁc example of a general principle which could arguably be at play in our experiments: people are
simply not good at modus tollens.Chapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 74
lossframeinformationthatarguesthatalossismorelikelyshouldhaveamuchlargereffect
than information which contradicts this hypothesis. On the other hand, if what is causing
the imbalance is the ‘favorable’ nature of the information then the effects of information
which argues that a loss is less likely should dominate the effects of ‘loss more likely’
information. To address this, we conducted an additional experiment in the domain of
losses.
3.7.1 Methods
Sixty participants were recruited from AMT and were presented with hypothetical pull-
a-chip rounds in a within-subject design. Participants were presented with 9 rounds. Par-
ticipants began each round with an endowment of $50, at the end of a round a chip was
drawn from a bag of 100 red or blue chips. If the drawn chip were red, participants would
lose their endowment, if it were blue, they would keep their endowment. Participants were
then asked to indicate their WTP for an insurance ticket, which would protect their en-
dowment if a red chip were drawn. An insurance ticket had no effect if a blue chip was
drawn. Additionally, participants were given partial information about each bag’s contents
using the knowledge levels from experiment 1. All participants entered responses for all 9
knowledge levels.
3.7.2 Results
We used continuous linear regression to measure the impact of information on WTP
for an insurance ticket. Regressing WTP on number of red chips and number of blue chips
shows that number of blue (no loss chips) decreases WTP for insurance while number of
red (loss chips) has no signiﬁcant effect on WTP (table 3.9). Using just the point estimates,
average magnitude of the effect of unfavorable (loss) information is approximately 30% of
the effect of favorable information with a Wald test rejecting equality of the absolute value
of the coefﬁcients at the p < :01 level. This result is robust to adding controls for gender,
age and interactions (column 2), subject level ﬁxed effects (column 3) as well as using a
Tobit regression to check for censoring (column 4).Chapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 75
We again ﬁnd convexity in our results. Regressing WTP for insurance on a factor model
(table 3.10) with controls and interactions shows that small amounts (25 chips) of favorable
information seem to have a small negative effect on WTP for insurance while large amounts
(50 chips) have a larger (more than 2x the size) negative effect indicating convexity. The
effects of unfavorable information seem to be all over the place. In some speciﬁcations
small amounts (25 chips) of unfavorable information seems to increase WTP for insurance
tickets, in some it seems to decrease it. In the most ‘pessimistic’ (relative to our hypothe-
sis) speciﬁcation, unfavorable information’s positive effect on WTP for insurance is much
smaller than the countervailing effect of favorable information. Again, this is consistent
with our main argument: favorable information affect WTP signiﬁcantly and in the right
direction, while unfavorable information is treated qualitatively differently.
3.8 Biased Integration
In this section we begin to expand beyond simply using WTP data to look for correla-
tions and explore psychological causes of our effect. Informally, we have been arguing that
individuals underweight unfavorable information during information processing. Though
our main experiments are not set up to look at the mechanism underlying our effects, here
we present a very simple model and some suggestive data looking at this hypothesis.
Consider the following simple model: there is a state of the world  2 fT;Fg: For
us, this is whether the trivia statement in question is true or false. Individuals start with a
prior p(T) and receive a signal s (a fact presented to them) of accuracy q (that is, prob(s j
 = T) = q). A simple reduced form way of modeling bias towards favorable information
is that when individuals receive a signal of accuracy q < 1
2 (that is, F is more likely) they
treat it as having accuracy q + (1   )1
2 with  2 [0;1] thus reducing its impact on
their posteriors when T matters for their payoffs, however, when they are simply asked to
estimate probabilities, they incorporate information with no bias.
Now, suppose that individuals report whether a fact is favorable or unfavorable using
a cutoff rule. That is, if q 2 [0; 1
2   ] they report the fact as unfavorable, q 2 [1
2 + ;1]
they report as favorable (with  2 [0; 1
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gives the following hypothesis: suppose we take another group of individuals and ask them
to simply evaluate whether facts are neutral or lean in a particular direction. This means
that the percentage of agreement between our original experimental participants and these
new individuals should vary depending on information valence: both groups should agree
fairly often when information is favorable however, individuals who are in our trivia game
should, when restricted to ‘unfavorable’ facts, be more likely to say they are neutral than
the group simply evaluating the facts. Again, this is not a perfect test of our hypothesis but
it is a useful exercise to consider.
First, we recruited participants (n = 86) from AMT to judge the ‘objective’ nature
of our facts. To do this, each participant was presented with a ‘non-directional’ version
of each trivia statement (eg. “The temperature on day Y in X was less than Z degrees”
became “The temperature on day Y in X was less or more than Z degrees.”) as well as
both possible facts. They then rated the facts as directional (e.g. “This fact makes me think
that the temperature was more than Z”) or neutral (“This fact doesn’t help me evaluate this
statement.”). We coded these directional ratings as +1 if the participant said that the fact
made the ‘greater than’ side of the statement more likely,  1 if they said that the fact made
the ‘less than’ side more likely and 0 if they stated that the fact was neutral. We then called
facts ‘objectively more’ if the average rating was signiﬁcantly positive, ‘objectively less’
if the average rating was signiﬁcantly negative and neutral if it is was not different from
0: Out of 20 possible facts we found that 15 were non-neutral according to Turkers. Then,
considering the particular trivia statement that participants received we classiﬁed facts as
‘objectively favorable’ or ‘objectively unfavorable.’ For example, if a trivia statement was
about ‘X is more than Z’ facts which were rated as ‘objectively more’ became ‘objectively
favorable.’
We then looked at the likelihood that a fact which was rated ‘objectively favorable’
was actually rated favorable by our experimental participants, this occurred 73:5% of the
time. In contrast, a fact which was rated ‘objectively unfavorable’ was rated unfavorable
by our participants only 50:4% of the time. This difference is signiﬁcant at the p < :01
level (rank-sum test). This data suggests that one mechanism underlying our effect is the
underweighting of unfavorable information.Chapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 77
3.9 Experiment 4: Unshrouding Effects
Existing accounts of ambiguity aversion point to another possible mechanism for our
asymmetry: an aversion to ignorance. Individuals appear to care not only about their es-
timate of the likelihood of an event, but also about how accurate they feel their estimate
is. Thus, more ambiguous situations are aversive because individuals do not feel they can
accurately estimate the likelihoods of outcomes. If this is the case, then each piece of infor-
mation has two effects: one on the likelihood of a winning outcome, and one on certainty.
Favorable information increases both likelihood estimations and certainty (both positive
effects) while unfavorable information has a negative component (decreasing likelihood)
but also a positive component (increasing certainty). This mechanism, which we call “un-
shrouding” could also account for a part of our observed asymmetry.
In our next experiment, we test for the presence of this mechanism.
3.9.1 Methods
Two hundred participants were recruited from AMT and were presented with hypo-
thetical pull-a-chip rounds in a within-subject design. We expanded our initial stimu-
lus set with 6 additional randomly generated knowledge levels with X and Y given by:
(45;30);(40;15);(35;60);(15;80);(70;15) and (15;15) this gave us 15 possible knowl-
edge levels to draw from. Each participant played an X = 50;Y = 50 round followed by
a completely ambiguous round followed by 5 additional rounds whose knowledge levels
were drawn from the full set of 15:
In each round participants indicated their WTP for a ticket which won if a red chip
were drawn. They also indicated their “estimate” that a red or blue chip would be drawn
using an 11 point scale from -5 (Red for Sure), 0 (Either color is equally likely) to 5 (Blue
for sure) in a design similar to the control in experiment 1: Finally, they were asked to
indicate how “certain they felt their estimate was accurate” from a 0 (Not very certain) to
7 (Extremely certain) scale. The style of the questions were explained to participants in
the instructions using the example of a coin toss (equally likely, totally certain of accuracy)
and a sports game between unknown teams (equally likely, not very certain of accuracy).Chapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 78
See the appendix for study instructions as well as sample rounds.
3.9.2 Results
Regressing WTP for a red ticket on numred and numblue replicates our earlier results
(table 3.11). We again ﬁnd gender effects, males appear to respond much more strongly
than females to favorable information (see the interaction terms).
However, wenowcandeﬁnetwonewvariablesofinterest: llredwhichisourlikelihood
score (reverse coded so higher numbers meana higher subjective estimate of the probability
of a red chip coming out) and cert which is the individuals’ certainty rating. First, we plot
WTP as function llred: ﬁgure 3.3 shows a strong correlation:
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Figure 3.3: Experiment 4: WTP by reported subjective likelihood of red
Figure 3.4 shows WTP as a function of certainty for each possible level of llred: Over-
all, there is a positive effect of certainty at almost all levels of llred: Less than 10% of the
data includes levels of llred of less than  3 or greater than +3 – so I have dropped those.
We can conﬁrm both of these effects with a regression: regressing WTP on llred and cert
gives positive, signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on both variables (table 3.12). Thus, both likelihoodChapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 79
(point estimate) and certainty (prior divergence) appear to have positive effects on WTP
as the model above predicts. To make comparisons of effect sizes easier, table 3.22 in the
appendix shows the same regressions performed on standardized version of the likelihood
and certainty variables – both are substantial, a one deviation increase in llred on aver-
age increases WTP by $2 whereas a one standard deviation increase in reported certainty
increases WTP by approximately $1.
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Figure 3.4: Experiment 4: WTP by reported reported certainty for various reported levels
of reported likelihood of red being drawn. Each panel represents a ﬁxed level of reported
likelihood, with certainty on the X axis.
We can also see if information has the expected effects on certainty and likelihood esti-
mates. Table 3.13 shows a regression of llred (column 1) and cert (column 2) on numred
and numblue: We see that information about red chips has a positive and signiﬁcant effect
on estimations of likelihood while the number of blue chips has a negative and signiﬁ-
cant effect. Note that there appears to be some bias towards the integration of favorableChapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 80
information. Looking at the effects on likelihood estimates, the coefﬁcients on numred
and numblue differ in magnitudes signiﬁcantly (Wald test p < :01) but the magnitude of
the effect is on the order of 15%: However, both numred and numblue have signiﬁcant
positive effects as would be expected if our measure was capturing something like prior
dispersion.
We can do a robustness check of using not simply levels of likelihood and certainty as a
measure but individual changes in certainty. To do this, we can form new variables lld and
certd by differencing reported likelihood/certainty at each knowledge level with baseline
likelihood/certainty in the completely unknown case. In this case, we are left with variables
that are positive over 90% of the time, as it should be. We can now repeat our regression
analysis by regressing WTP on lld and certd: Table 3.23 in the appendix shows that our
effects are robust to using this analysis.
3.10 Conclusion
Our series of experiments shows that the behavioral effects of information on ambigu-
ous valuations are very asymmetric: favorable information strongly increases valuations
while unfavorable information has a much smaller effect. However, this is driven by a
combination of two mechanisms: both a bias towards the integration of favorable informa-
tion and also an unshrouding effect.
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Table 3.8: Experiment 2 (Trivia): WTP on subjectively reported knowledge levels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wtp wtp wtp wtp
subjgood 7.293 8.768 9.449 11.52
(1.022) (1.371) (1.575) (2.197)
subjbad -2.712 -1.204 -1.717 -1.145
(0.974) (1.327) (1.459) (1.839)
know 0.860 0.891 1.145
(0.383) (0.375) (0.530)
knowXsgood -0.692 -0.558 -0.826
(0.501) (0.510) (0.634)
knowXsbad -0.693 -0.610 -1.118
(0.617) (0.541) (0.722)
ismale -1.017 -1.725
(1.416) (2.072)
maleXsgood -2.897 -2.738
(1.925) (2.534)
maleXsbad 0.911 1.408
(1.971) (2.920)
Constant 7.403 5.520 5.834 4.188
(0.765) (1.300) (1.435) (2.078)
Observations 370 370 370 370
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level
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Table 3.9: Experiment 3: WTP for insurance on continuous variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
insure insure (Subject FE) Tobit
numred 0.0268 -0.00522 0.0268 -0.00137
(0.0184) (0.0241) (0.0195) (0.0285)
numblue -0.0771 -0.0904 -0.0771 -0.0841
(0.0141) (0.0188) (0.0149) (0.0174)
gender -4.094 -3.832
(3.221) (2.809)
genderXred 0.0566 0.0506
(0.0354) (0.0415)
genderXblue 0.0235 0.0297
(0.0276) (0.0314)
age -0.166+
(0.0932)
Constant 18.21 20.53 18.21 25.26
(1.591) (2.546) (0.488) (3.795)
Observations 477 477 477 477
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level
+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01Chapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 83
Table 3.10: Experiment 3: WTP for insurance with factor model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
insure insure (Subject FE) Tobit
numred=25 -1.434 -3.019 -3.019 -3.892
(0.509) (1.322) (1.399) (1.439)
numred=50 1.340 -0.245 -0.245 -1.168
(0.920) (1.551) (1.642) (1.791)
numblue=25 -0.314 -1.906 -1.906 -2.700+
(0.661) (1.233) (1.305) (1.501)
numblue=50 -3.855 -5.434 -5.434 -5.656
(0.707) (1.253) (1.326) (1.614)
numred=25 X numblue=25 2.321 2.321 3.487
(2.036) (2.155) (2.254)
numred=25 X numblue=50 2.434 2.434 2.802
(1.658) (1.755) (1.967)
numred=50 X numblue=25 2.453 2.453 3.444+
(1.555) (1.646) (1.776)
numred=50 X numblue=50 2.302 2.302 4.060+
(1.719) (1.820) (2.072)
gender -2.581 -1.807
(3.035) (2.727)
age -0.177 -0.165+
(0.110) (0.0931)
Constant 18.38 26.81 19.43 26.04
(1.620) (4.648) (0.928) (3.957)
Observations 477 477 477 477
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level.
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Table 3.11: Experiment 4: WTP as a function of information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wtp wtp wtp wtp
numred 0.139 0.139 0.0920 0.100
(0.0133) (0.0128) (0.0146) (0.0157)
numblue -0.0360 -0.0328 -0.0323 -0.0409
(0.00651) (0.00616) (0.00756) (0.00925)
gender 4.080 1.966 1.892
(0.815) (0.792) (0.851)
age -0.0863 -0.0864 -0.106+
(0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0596)
maleXred 0.0744 0.0748
(0.0232) (0.0244)
maleXblue -0.00118 0.00522
(0.0115) (0.0130)
Constant 5.088 5.034 6.382 6.734
(0.421) (1.747) (1.753) (1.948)
sigma
Constant 7.242
(0.373)
Observations 1162 1162 1162 1162
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level
+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01Chapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 85
Table 3.12: Experiment 4: WTP as a function of likelihood and certainty estimates
(1) (2) (3)
wtp wtp wtp
llred 1.332 1.418 1.068
(0.137) (0.133) (0.148)
cert 1.064 1.047 0.717
(0.157) (0.145) (0.158)
gender 4.315 2.058
(0.799) (0.968)
age -0.103 -0.101
(0.0505) (0.0500)
maleXll 0.541
(0.238)
maleXcert 0.490+
(0.262)
Constant 3.232 3.728 5.237
(0.620) (1.839) (1.625)
Observations 1162 1162 1162
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level
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Table 3.13: Experiment 4: Likelihood and certainty as functions of information
(1) (2)
llred cert
numred 0.0477 0.0296
(0.00213) (0.00210)
numblue -0.0424 0.0243
(0.00176) (0.00171)
Constant -0.401 3.278
(0.0993) (0.143)
Observations 1162 1162
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level
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Table 3.14: Experiment 1 WTP using continuous variables (pull-a-chip only)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wtp wtp wtp Tobit
numred 0.154 0.156 0.135 0.159
(0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0203) (0.0225)
numblue -0.00255 -0.00179 -0.00422 -0.0124
(0.0121) (0.0123) (0.0144) (0.0169)
gender 3.063 1.903+ 2.108+
(1.216) (1.107) (1.277)
age -0.104+ -0.104+ -0.106+
(0.0528) (0.0529) (0.0577)
genderXred 0.0428 0.0338
(0.0375) (0.0401)
genderXblue 0.00412 0.00677
(0.0248) (0.0275)
Constant 5.909 7.611 8.219 7.486
(0.616) (1.936) (1.846) (2.073)
Observations 525 525 525 525
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level
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Table 3.15: Experiment 1 WTP using continuous variables (majority only)
(1) (2) (3)
wtp wtp wtp
numred 0.166 0.170 0.103
(0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0276)
numblue -0.0382 -0.0388 -0.0115
(0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0157)
gender 4.832 3.042+
(1.462) (1.613)
age -0.0267 -0.0268
(0.0680) (0.0685)
genderXred 0.109
(0.0389)
genderXblue -0.0423+
(0.0243)
Constant 7.475 5.426 6.510
(0.767) (2.483) (2.515)
Observations 550 550 550
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level
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Table 3.16: Experiment 1: Conﬁdence using continuous variables
(1) (2) (3)
conf conf conf
numred 0.0394 0.0362 0.0337
(0.00232) (0.00338) (0.00480)
numblue -0.00470 -0.00765 -0.00338
(0.00229) (0.00345) (0.00395)
pull -0.277 -0.275
(0.181) (0.183)
pullXred 0.00678 0.00741
(0.00457) (0.00471)
pullXblue 0.00589 0.00491
(0.00454) (0.00441)
gender 0.163 0.206
(0.131) (0.178)
age -0.0150 -0.0150
(0.00610) (0.00609)
genderXred 0.00376
(0.00477)
genderXblue -0.00687
(0.00447)
Constant 2.567 3.087 3.068
(0.0919) (0.232) (0.236)
Observations 899 899 899
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level
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Table 3.17: Experiment 1 (with choice): Conﬁdence on continuous variables
(1) (2) (3)
conf conf conf
chosencolor 0.0230 0.0260 0.0161
(0.00259) (0.00425) (0.00580)
othercolor -0.000956 -0.00744 0.00407
(0.00291) (0.00456) (0.00604)
pull 0.445 0.460
(0.213) (0.212)
pullXchosen -0.00612 -0.00497
(0.00525) (0.00523)
pullXother 0.0147 0.0131
(0.00562) (0.00566)
gender 0.0625 0.0113
(0.187) (0.213)
age 0.0108 0.0102
(0.00864) (0.00849)
genderXchosen 0.0141
(0.00538)
genderXother -0.0161
(0.00569)
Constant 2.597 2.048 2.084
(0.108) (0.338) (0.343)
Observations 709 709 709
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 3.18: Experiment 2 (Poker Chips - Pull-a-Chip Only): WTP on continuous variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wtp wtp (Subject FE) Tobit
main
numgood 0.0993 0.0993 0.0993 0.109
(0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0145) (0.0155)
numbad -0.0123 -0.0123 -0.0123 -0.0121
(0.00938) (0.00940) (0.00993) (0.0110)
ismale -0.453 -0.517
(1.139) (1.237)
age 0.112 0.121
(0.204) (0.214)
Constant 6.362 4.086 6.362 3.403
(0.646) (4.423) (0.463) (4.657)
Observations 333 333 333 333
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level.
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Table 3.19: Experiment 2 (Poker Chips - Majority Only): WTP on continuous variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wtp wtp (Subject FE) Tobit
main
numgood 0.138 0.138 0.138 0.165
(0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0150) (0.0178)
numbad -0.0555 -0.0555 -0.0555 -0.0669
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0157) (0.0189)
ismale -1.158 -1.657
(1.177) (1.415)
age 0.228 0.299
(0.233) (0.269)
Constant 6.416 1.876 6.416 -0.440
(0.742) (5.059) (0.446) (5.852)
Observations 333 333 333 333
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level.
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Table 3.20: Experiment 2 (Poker Chips): Conﬁdence on continuous variables
(1) (2) (3)
conf conf conf
numgood 0.0322 0.0364 0.0353
(0.00288) (0.00378) (0.00421)
numbad -0.00955 -0.0160 -0.0126
(0.00280) (0.00389) (0.00440)
pull -0.192 -0.192
(0.167) (0.167)
pullXgood -0.00837 -0.00836
(0.00402) (0.00403)
pullXbad 0.0130 0.0130
(0.00302) (0.00302)
ismale 0.176 0.335
(0.200) (0.285)
age -0.0253 -0.0252
(0.0350) (0.0350)
maleXgood 0.00279
(0.00605)
maleXbad -0.00915
(0.00548)
Constant 2.481 3.062 3.002
(0.135) (0.776) (0.772)
Observations 665 665 665
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level.
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Table 3.21: Experiment 2 (Trivia): WTP on subjectively reported knowledge levels
(1) (2) (3)
conf conf conf
subjgood 1.422 1.664 1.836
(0.258) (0.407) (0.421)
subjbad 0.246 0.163 0.0786
(0.183) (0.299) (0.316)
know 0.661 0.656
(0.0853) (0.0818)
knowXsgood -0.174 -0.137
(0.111) (0.100)
knowXsbad -0.0228 0.00153
(0.105) (0.111)
ismale -0.0186
(0.238)
maleXsgood -0.730+
(0.390)
maleXsbad 0.0965
(0.288)
Constant 2.653 1.195 1.210
(0.193) (0.243) (0.276)
Observations 370 370 370
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level
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Table 3.22: Experiment 4: WTP as a function of likelihood and certainty estimates (stan-
dardized)
(1) (2) (3)
wtp wtp wtp
llred(std) 2.680 2.854 2.150
(0.277) (0.269) (0.299)
cert(std) 1.856 1.826 1.250
(0.275) (0.252) (0.275)
gender 4.315 4.293
(0.799) (0.799)
age -0.103 -0.101
(0.0505) (0.0500)
maleXlls 1.088
(0.480)
maleXcerts 0.855+
(0.457)
Constant 8.043 8.436 8.435
(0.459) (1.675) (1.667)
Observations 1162 1162 1162
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level
+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01Chapter 3: Ambiguity, Information and Valuation 96
Table 3.23: Experiment 4: WTP as a function of likelihood and certainty estimates (differ-
ences)
(1) (2) (3)
wtp wtp Tobit
lld 1.358 1.263 1.360
(0.159) (0.153) (0.166)
certd 0.467 0.451 0.447
(0.181) (0.172) (0.181)
gender 3.562 3.654
(0.816) (0.870)
age -0.0620 -0.0795
(0.0552) (0.0623)
Constant 7.093 6.777 7.075
(0.508) (1.809) (2.009)
Observations 1162 1162 1162
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at participant level
+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01Chapter 4
How to Commit (If You Must)
4.1 Brief Summary
This paper studies how dual-self (Fudenberg and Levine (2006)) decision-makers can
use commitment technologies to combat temptation and implement long-run optimal ac-
tions. I consider two types of such technologies: carrot contracts (rewards for ‘good’ be-
havior ﬁnanced by borrowing from future consumption) and stick contracts (self imposed
ﬁnes for ‘bad’ behavior). Both types of contracts can simulate binding commitment when
it is not available and thus offers of such contracts make DMs better off. I show that the
exact properties of optimal carrots and sticks depend crucially on the short-run discount
rate and the time it takes for the contract to ‘kick in.’ Finally, I compare the welfare im-
plications of these contracts and show that dual-self decision-makers strictly prefer to use
carrots instead of either sticks or binding commitments. This is for several reasons: sticks
are highly vulnerable to trembles (while carrots are not), sticks and binding commitments
create a temptation to cancel them (while carrots do not), and ﬁnally carrots allow easy
tradeoffs between commitment and ﬂexibility (while sticks and binding commitments do
not).
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4.2 Introduction
Many of us would like to exercise, work efﬁciently and stay away from our bad habits
yet we often ﬁnd ourselves skipping a daily run, looking at funny cat videos on the internet,
smoking another cigarette or eating another cupcake. Such mismatches between what we
would like to do tomorrow and what we actually end up doing create a demand for tech-
nologies to help individuals implement their normative goals. Existing literature1 shows
that this demand for commitment does exist but there is little theoretical work on what
forms optimal commitment technologies would take. This paper begins to bridge this gap.
The ﬁrst step to ﬁguring out optimal commitment technologies is learning what mech-
anism generates the problem in the ﬁrst place. Work in psychology and neuroscience tends
to focus on decisions as an interplay between an automatic and a controlled process (Kah-
neman (2003)). Recent work in social psychology makes this model more sharp by positing
that the controlled cognitive process uses a limited, costly resource to operate. A standard
template in such experiments involves subjects performing a ‘resource depleting task’ (con-
trolling attention, suppressing emotion, solving math problems) or a control task followed
by a second resource depleting task. Subjects who are had to perform the depleting task do
worse on the second task than controls (see Muraven and Baumeister (2000) for a survey).
Another set of experiments involve individuals making choices under cognitive load (for
example, subjects are asked to remember a 7 digit number), these individuals then act more
impulsively than controls (eg. by choosing more unhealthy foods to eat as in Shiv and Fe-
dorikhin (1999)). In such a model our difﬁculties at the desert tray come from an interplay
of automatic impulses compelling us to eat, and a conscious use of mental resources not to
give in.2
This paper uses a particular economic model of this process: the dual-self model of
Fudenberg and Levine (2006) (henceforth FL). This model is a speciﬁc case of a larger
1Ashraf et al. (2006), Kaur et al. (2010), Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) consider commitment in the ﬁeld,
Houser et al. (2010) considers commitment in the lab. Bryan et al. (2010) survey the existing research.
2Work such as Hare et al. (2009) in neuroeconomics points to a possible neural algorithm for this model
in which control networks in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex modulate ‘overreactions’ by the brain’s reward
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set of costly self-control models.3 In such models decisions are a compromise between a
‘temptation’ ranking and a ‘normative’ ranking, with the DM balancing a desire to choose
according to his normative preference with a self-control cost of deviating from the temp-
tation ranking.
The FL model imposes speciﬁc restrictions on where the disagreement between the
temptation and normative preferences comes from: the DM uses a standard time-separable
utility function to evaluate consumption streams (or dynamic plans) but the temptation or
automatic process discounts the future at a much sharper rate than the DM would like.
Thus the DM is tempted to behave impulsively and must use self-control to choose long-
run rewards. Because of this structure FL refer to the automatic impulse as the short-run
(SR) self and the cognitive control process as the long-run (LR) self.4 Note that this is a
different type of model than those studied in the literature on hyperbolic/quasi-hyperbolic
discounting (eg. Laibson (1997), Ainslie and Haslam (1992)). In those models the DM’s
problems come from the fact that rankings of alternatives change in different periods. In the
FL model both the SR and LR self are perfectly time consistent so the tension comes from
multiple preferences within a period rather than multiple preferences between periods. The
purpose of this paper is not to provide a clean test to differentiate these models, rather it is
to look at commitment behavior with the FL model. However, all results that could never
hold under a time-inconsistent framework are ﬂagged as such.
The FL model generates a huge demand for commitment and this paper considers two
types of technologies that could be available to a DM facing temptation. The ﬁrst are stick
contracts that levy a ﬁne on the DM when he gives in to temptation.5 The second are carrots
3Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), Dekel et al. (2009), Gul and Pesendorfer (2004), Noor and Takeoka (2010)
are highly visible examples in which self-control costs are variable and depend on the amount of adjustment
the control process needs to do. Benhabib and Bisin (2005) consider the case where the control process is
treated as having a ﬁxed cost to activate.
4The analysis of Fudenberg and Levine (2006) considers the case where the SR self is perfectly myopic,
Fudenberg and Levine (2012) extends to the case where the SR self can have some degree of patience.
5A market version of such contracts is provided by the website StickK.com that allows individuals to set
measurable goals, punishments and a referee. If an individual does not accomplish his goal, as reported by the
referee, the website will automatically charge the individual’s credit card a donation to an ‘anti-charity’ of his
choice (for example, a life-long Democrat may choose to donate to ﬁnance the George W. Bush Presidential
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that reward a DM who takes normatively good actions. In this paper, carrots are ﬁnanced
by the intertemporal substitution of future consumption to the present conditional on the
DM resisting a temptation. The main results show that both of these types of contracts can
only be welfare improving for a DM if they change the nature of the temptation he faces -
i.e. the SR self’s optimal action. The logic is one of revealed preference combined with the
economic idea that self-control is treated as a cost. If a DM gives in to a temptation, this is
because the self-control required to resist it was too expensive. If a commitment technol-
ogy does not physically remove the tempting option, then it must remove the temptation
associated with that option because if it does not, its ultimate effect is only to make the
DM exert the self-control that he didn’t ﬁnd optimal to exert in the ﬁrst place. This means
that if the source of the temptation is sharp discounting, both types of contracts must have
one of two features: either their effects must be close in time to the choice or they must be
particularly large. In fact, as the paper shows later, their size increases exponentially with
the delay between action and punishment.
The natural question to ask given these results is whether carrots, sticks or binding com-
mitments are favored by the dual-self DMs. The ﬁnal set of results shows that carrots are
preferred for several reasons. First, sticks will implement a punishment if the DM trembles
and executes unintended actions with small probability whereas a tremble in the presence
of a carrot makes the DM no worse off than before the contract. Second, sticks and binding
commitments require self-control to implement in the ﬁrst place and if the DM receives
opportunities to cancel the contract, the cancellation acts as an additional temptation and
source of self-control problems in the case of sticks and binding commitments but not car-
rots. Finally, the DM may have a desire for ﬂexibility. If the temptation’s size is stochastic
optimal carrots allow the DM to retain the ﬂexibility choose the temptation when it is LR
optimal while sticks and binding commitments do not.
The results in this paper are related to those of Ali (2011) who shows that carrots are
advantageous for DMs seeking ﬂexibility in a planner-doer model of self-control in which
the planner attempts to learn about the doer’s preferences. From a theoretical perspective,
this paper together with the results of Ali (2011) indicate that there is much to be learned by
adding dynamic behavior into models of self-control. More practically they also indicate
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ways of dealing with self-control problems.
4.3 The Basic Model
We now introduce the basic dual-self model used in Fudenberg and Levine (2012) in
continuous time. All formal proofs of results are relegated to the appendix.
The DM begins at time t = 1 and faces a ‘simple temptation.’ He chooses an action
from the set fT(ake);R(exist)g: If he chooses T he gains a beneﬁt b at that moment,
however, at t = 2 he takes a loss of 1: If he chooses R, he gains no payoffs but suffers no
loses later. Taking a temptation means that the DM takes a payoff now for a loss later while
R keeps payoffs constant between periods.
The DM is split into two ‘selves’ that interact to make decisions. The long-run (LR)
self discounts the future with an instantaneous discount rate of  (which we take to be 0
for simplicity) and the short-run (SR) self discounts at a faster rate : The intuition behind
how the selves interact is as follows: when the DM faces a choice, the SR self ‘suggests’
to take the action that maximizes SR utility, the LR self can then choose to either go with
this suggestion or to change to a different action. However, if the LR self wishes to change
course he must pay a self-control cost to do so. This cost is proportional to the amount
of utility the SR self must give up. Thus, this model represents in a simple, stylized way
an interaction between ‘automatic’ or ‘affective’ processes that drive individuals toward
immediate rewards (the SR self) and cognitive processes (the LR self) that can be invoked
to control them and that become more costly as temptations become larger. For the rest
of this exposition, as has been common in the literature, the LR self’s preferences will be
used whenever welfare metrics for the DM are discussed.
We now formalize the discussion above: suppose that the DM faces a set of consump-
tion streams A; the LR self’s utility from an action x is given by
uLR(x)   SC(x)
where uLR(x) is the discounted value of x using the discount rate  and SC(x) is the self-
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SR self’s preferred action x
SR is 0 and the cost of self control from choosing a different
action is given by
SC(x) =  (uSR(x

SR)   uSR(x))
where uSR(x) is the discounted value of x using the SR discount rate :
Thus, the LR self will use self control whenever the beneﬁt from choosing x instead of
x
SR exceeds the self-control cost required to do so. In the analysis that follows,   will be
assumed to be a linear function as in Fudenberg and Levine (2006) but the main results in
this paper are robust to using a different functional form.
Note that the LR self is perfectly time consistent but does display demand for binding
commitment as the mere existence of tempting options creates a potentially costly conﬂict.
Note as well that unlike in models of time-inconsistency, the DM may want to remove
options from future choice sets even when he knows for sure that he will not take them.
Applying this model to the simple temptation problem, this interaction is played out in
the following way: if R is chosen, the SR self gains a utility of uSR(R) = 0 while if T is
chosen the SR self gains utility
uSR(T) = b   e
 :
Suppose that b   e  > 0 so the SR self prefers to take the temptation. This means the LR
self gets utility 0 from R and gets utility from choosing T given by
b   1   SC(T):
To motivate the problem, we take b < 1 and   (b   e ) < b   1: Without any
intervention we have that the SR self prefers to take, the LR self prefers to resist but will
not do so given the size of self-control costs.
4.3.1 Sticks
We now consider how the DM can implement the long-run optimal action in the ab-
sence of perfectly binding commitment devices. First we consider how a DM is able to use
contracts that assign a penalty of size k to a choice of T (sticks). This penalty is delivered
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enforcement mechanism to observe the agent’s action and implement the punishment. Sev-
eral of the results consider what happens when t0 > 1 but setting t0 = 1 does not change
other results. Figure 4.1 shows the full timeline.
We can now turn to existing sticks for intuition: alcoholics sometimes take the drug
Antabuse. This drug stops the body from correctly metabolizing alcohol - the result makes
it so that taking even a small drink of alcohol results almost immediately into an experience
similar to a severe hangover. Control-It! is a foul tasting (but completely safe) liquid that
individuals who are attempting to quit biting their nails apply to them. Individuals try-
ing to lose weight take the drug Xenecal (available over-the-counter as Alli in the United
States). This drug acts in a similar manner to Antabuse by making the eating of fats a
highly unpleasant experience. In each of these examples punishments come almost im-
mediately after the bad behavior in question and so t0 is very close to 1: However, if we
consider StickK.com, punishments are only realized after the DM’s referee reports that he
has chosen T: In this case, it seems reasonable to think that t0 will be bounded away from
t = 1 by a non-trivial amount.
t=1 
Temptation 
t’ 
Contract enforced 
t=2 
Disutility realized 
Figure 4.1: Timeline of the base problem.
In this setup LR utility at the time of choice of choosing to submit to temptation given
a stick of size k is given by
uLR(T;k) = b   k   1
and the SR utility of the same is given by
uSR(T;k) = b   e
 t0
k   e
 :
To make notation simpler, for an action  2 fT;Rg and contract of size k we deﬁne (;k)
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be the action that maximizes the LR self’s utility net of self-control costs (and thus the
DM’s welfare). We denote the welfare by
W(;k) = uLR(;k)   (;k):
We can now discuss the effects of the contracts on the DM’s behavior and welfare.
First, deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 2. Say that a stick implements resisting if (k) = R: Let KR be the set of sticks
that implement resisting.
We now turn to deﬁning optimal sticks:
Deﬁnition 3. The set of optimal sticks is deﬁned by
K
 := fk 2 R+ j W(
(k);k)  W(
(k
0);k
0)
for any k0 2 R+:
The next proposition concerns the perfectly myopic SR selves studied in Fudenberg and
Levine (2006).
Proposition 4. Suppose the SR self completely discounts all future payoffs and t0 > 1, then
KR 6= ; but K = f0g:
This result states that when the SR self is perfectly myopic, the DM is always made
worse off with a stick that does not punish him immediately when he succumbs to temp-
tation. This means that under such circumstances, the DM will never take a stick when
offered. The intuition for the proposition comes from the rational way in which self-control
is treated in the FL model. We know that under the condition k = 0 the cost of self-control
to implement resisting was larger than the foregone gains to the LR self. Since at time
t = 0 the whole of the contract is in the future a perfectly myopic SR self is completely
unaffected by the imposition of the contract; the only channel that remains for the contract
to operate through is making the future consequences of the temptation so unattractive that
the LR self will choose to exercise self-control and avoid the extra punishment. Thus the
existence of the contract represents a welfare decrease for the LR self. Allowing for SR
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Proposition 5. Suppose that the SR self discounts at a positive but not inﬁnite rate, then
K ( KR: Moreover
K
 = fk  k
 =
b   e 
e t0 g
and so is independent of   and LR discounting.
This proof of the proposition shows that for an FL DM works in a very particular
way. Simply implementing resisting is not enough to make an optimal contract, rather the
possible loss from the contract must be large enough to change the optimal course of action
for the SR self. Note that it is possible to reﬁne this set further using the intuition that there
is no incentive for the DM to take a contract beyond the size of k as a larger stick does not
change any behavior on the equilibrium path but increases possible losses to the DM in the
case of a tremble. This intuition is developed in the Appendix.
There are two other points to be taken from this analysis. First:
Corollary 1. For any value of  self-control is never exercised with any optimal stick.
This implies that optimal sticks can simulate perfectly binding commitments and thus
are a useful device for dual-self DMs. Additionally, in the dual-self model, sticks have one
additional property:
Corollary 2. For any value of  there exists an open set (k;k) such that k 2 (k;k) imple-
ments resisting but does not improve welfare over k = 0:
Note that this is would be impossible in a model of time-inconsistency (assuming that
we used the common welfare criterion of the t = 0 self) as in such a model any commit-
ment device that implemented R would necessarily be welfare increasing. In addition, this
interval can, in general, be quite large as k is a constant and k strictly increases in :
The next proposition characterizes a property that all optimal sticks must display:
Corollary 3. The lower bound for optimal sticks k grows exponentially as the enforcement
time, t0 moves away from 1: The speed of this growth is proportional to the SR discount rate
:
While in a perfect world this proposition poses no problems, in a world where DMs
can tremble to Take with a small probability there is a completely different story. WhenChapter 4: How to Commit (If You Must) 106
contracts can be taken that employ punishment almost immediately, their effects do not
have to be extraordinarily large but as we push the time of resolution backward and the
contract grows exponentially we run into problems.
To appreciate the impact of this growth, consider a case where b = :5 and that the SR
self discounts at a rate of 50% per day with t = 2 approximately 1 month later.6 If t0 is
three days later the optimal stick size is approximately k = 4 – this is 8 times the gain from
the contract. If t0 is a week later then the optimal contract has a punishment size of 64 times
the utility gain from implementing the normatively superior action. In this case, even a 2%
chance of the DM trembling to adhere to the long-run optimal action makes the contract
not worth it. A similar result can be recovered if we require simply that the stick is welfare
improving and not necessarily optimal.
4.3.2 Carrots
We now consider a different type of commitment contract, a carrot. In this type of con-
tract the DM receives a reward of utility size r if he takes the long-run optimal action. For
simplicity, we assume that this reward is ﬁnanced by borrowing from future consumption.
For example, a DM may commit to ‘buying themselves something nice’ if they manage
to ﬁnish a particular project on time. Additionally, to make the comparison between the
costless sticks and carrots possible we assume that the LR preference is indifferent between
consuming r today and the discounted future value of r:7
The timeline with carrots is identical to that of the one with sticks: the carrot is admin-
istered at time t0 2 [1;2] if the long-run optimal action R is taken. If the DM chooses T
then the carrot is not activated and the future consumption stream of the DM is untouched.
6Pinning down SR discount rates is an important but difﬁcult empirical challenge. For example, McClure
et al. (2007) consider the case of primary rewards (juice for thirsty individuals) and show that the discount
horizon for the ‘short-run’ is about  60% per 25 minutes in their experiment. However in many other
experiments (including any ones that involve monetary payouts) individuals appear to react impulsively to
short run rewards that they will not receive until at least the end of the experiment. Clearly, SR discounting
must display some sort of context dependence.
7If this neutrality isn’t satisﬁed then the intertemporal loss from changing consumption can be viewed as
a shadow cost of using the carrot contract even in the absence of other costs. Thus, the DM will only take
a carrot if the intertemporal loss is less than 1   b: The appendix discusses in more detail the magnitude of
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We maintain identical notation from the last section and deﬁne the set of resistance imple-
menting carrots RR and the set of optimal carrots R analogously.
In the case of perfectly myopic SR selves we get an analogue to proposition 4 for
carrots:
Proposition 6. Suppose the SR self completely discounts all future payoffs and t0 > 1, then
RR = ; and 0 2 R
Thus carrots are never useful when the SR self perfectly discounts the future. However,
whentheSRselfhasnon-negligiblevaluationoffutureconsumptioncarrotsbecomeuseful:
Proposition 7. Suppose that the SR self discounts at a positive but not inﬁnite rate, then
R ( RR: Moreover
R
 = fr  r
 =
b   e 
e t0 g
and so is independent of   and LR discounting.
Finally, just like sticks, carrots are able to perfectly simulate binding commitment:
Corollary 4. For any value of  self-control is never exercised with any optimal carrot.
And ﬁnally just like sticks:
Corollary 5. The lower bound for optimal carrots r grows exponentially as the enforce-
menttime, t0 movesawayfrom 1: Thespeedof thisgrowthisproportionaltothe SRdiscount
rate :
Thus, sticks and carrots are useful replacements for DMs seeking binding, but unavail-
able, commitment devices.
4.4 Comparison
We now turn to comparing the welfare effects of carrots to sticks. Notice that if we
assume that the DM trembles to the unintended action with probability ; carrots mechan-
ically gain an advantage over sticks because they provide no downside risk. We now con-
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the presence of stochastic opportunities to ‘call off’ a commitment. Second, we consider
the role of ﬂexibility in commitment. We show that each of these factors weigh the welfare
scale towards carrots and away from both sticks and binding commitments.
We consider a DM who faces the simple temptation above at time t = 1 but, at t =
0, has a chance to choose a commitment device from the menu fr;k;s;Ng where N
is no commitment, k is the optimal stick, r is the optimal carrot and s is the binding
contract that removes T from the DM’s menu. We assume that the SR self is not perfectly
myopic (thus k and r can simulate binding commitment even if t0 > 0).8 This is the key
assumption that drives the revision result but not the ﬂexibility result.
Furthermore we assume between t = 0 and t = 1 the DM lives in continuous time and
receives opportunities to revise his choice and costlessly replace any current commitment
with N: These opportunities arrive as a Poisson process with arrival rate  2 [0;1): Figure
4.2 shows the structure of the problem.
t=1 
Temptation 
t’ 
Contract enforced 
t=2 
Disutility realized 
t=0 
Commitment 
Revision opportunities arrive 
Figure 4.2: Timeline of the expanded problem.
To solve the problem the DM faces, we must specify how the SR self evaluates future
actions at t = 1 from a t = 0 perspective. Here we follow the assumption in Fuden-
berg and Levine (2012) that the SR self is strategically naive and assumes that all future
decisions will include no exercise of self-control by the LR self.9 We get the following
characterization of the DM’s behavior:
8Fudenberg and Levine (2012) give many reasons for assuming that the SR preferences display some
degree of patience. Rather than recapitulate their arguments, we point the interested reader to that paper.
9Note that we have already shown that no self-control is ever exercised at optimal carrots/sticks so
the main results in this section could still be derived under the assumption that SR self is strategically
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Proposition 8. For any value of ; the DM strictly prefers choosing the optimal carrot at
time 0 to any other option. Furthermore, there exists  such that if  >  the DM strictly
prefers no commitment to taking the optimal stick or the binding commitment device.
The intuition for the proposition comes from how sticks and carrots simulate binding
commitment in different ways. Optimal sticks and carrots both make the SR self indifferent
between T and R; however they do so in different ways. The stick lowers the utility of the
temptation for the SR self while the carrot raises the utility of resisting. This means that the
SR self is made worse off in the future by either binding commitment or the use of a stick
but is made weakly better off by the use of a carrot. The SR self isn’t perfectly myopic and
so now prefers carrots and no commitment to sticks and binding commitments. Because of
these SR preferences taking a stick or binding commitment requires self control by the LR
self when N is in the choice set, but taking a carrot does not.
The same logic holds during revision opportunities: canceling a stick or binding com-
mitment is itself a temptation that the DM must use self-control to resist. Thus, if the DM
expects many revision opportunities before t = 1 he may ﬁnd that the expected self-control
of taking a stick or binding commitment cost exceeds the beneﬁt. Contrarily, canceling
a carrot is not tempting and so the presence of revision opportunities does not affect the
DM’s valuation.
4.4.1 Flexibility
Another reason for the preference towards carrots over sticks comes from a desire for
ﬂexibility. We can expand the model above to one where b (the temptation) payoff is not a
single number but is in fact stochastic and ex-ante unknown. Suppose that b is distributed
on [0;bmax]: We suppose this distribution is well behaved and we call the PDF f() and
the CDF F():10 We now ask how demand for sticks, carrots and binding commitments
changes in this new situation. As above, suppose that sticks/carrots/binding commitments
are taken at time 0 and the DM is aware of the distribution of b at time 1: We set the revision
parameter to 0 to isolate ﬂexibility motives.
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We now compute the DM’s expected welfare from being uncommitted, then compare
that to the DM’s welfare from having a binding commitment, a stick contract or a carrot
contract. Note that when the DM is uncommitted due to continuity of the LR welfare in
b we can break up the interval [0;bmax] into several components. We know there exists a
subinterval [0;b] in which the DM resists the temptation and exercises no self-control (as
the SR self does not prefer T to R). We also know that there exists another subinterval
[b;b] such that for any value of b in this interval, the DM resists the temptation (but pays a
self-control cost to do so). In the interval [b;1] the DM does not resist the temptation (but
is made worse off), and ﬁnally, in the interval [1;bmax] the DM chooses T and because it is
LR superior to R:
We can compute the borders for these intervals simply: the ﬁrst bound is the SR self’s
indifference point b = e  and the second is the level of b at which the DM is indifferent
between taking and resisting
b =
1 +  e 
1 +  
:
We can compute that the DM is made better off under a binding commitment that under
no commitment if and only if the following condition holds:
Z b
b
 (b   e
 )dF +
Z 1
b
(b   1)dF 
Z bmax
1
(b   1)dF:
The intuition behind this condition is the following: the left hand side of the inequality
represents the gains from commitment. If b falls in the interval b to b and he were uncom-
mitted, the DM would have to exercise self-control. If b falls in the interval b to 1 the DM
would give in to the temptation. Having a binding commitment removes these two prob-
lems. However, it comes at a cost. If b falls in the interval 1 to bmax the DM would like,
from an LR perspective, to chose T: Thus, in this case a binding commitment causes the
DM to lose potential payoff.
Now, suppose we also allow the DM to choose from a full menu of sticks and carrots
(that is, any values of r or k). We get the following proposition:
Proposition 9. For any distribution of temptations F() the DM always weakly prefers
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is strict. Additionally, for F() that puts positive weight on any b > 1 there exists a carrot
such that DM is always strictly better off under that carrot than under any stick or binding
commitment.
This proposition comes from the intuitions developed in the last section. First, sticks
are at least as valuable as binding commitments because a very large k can always exactly
simulate the binding commitment. This can also hold strictly: the proof shows an example
in which sticks yield a strictly higher welfare than binding commitments.
The ﬁnal part of the proposition comes from the fact carrots have no downside: if the
DM chooses T under a carrot contract he simply foregoes his separate reward for R; how-
ever once a DM has chosen a stick he must lose payoff whenever he chooses T: Thus,
carrots allow for maximum ﬂexibility and are strictly preferred by the DM whenever ﬂexi-
bility is possible.
4.5 Conclusion
Models of self-control problems all predict a large demand for commitment in our daily
lives and indeed these technologies are all around us. Economists have studied binding
ﬁnancial commitment devices such as Christmas Clubs (Loewenstein and Thaler (1989))
or the use of illiquid assets (Laibson (1997)). In the digital world, the Apple Mac App store
contains apps such as Concentrate or Self-Control that allow the user to turn off access to
certain websides (eg. Facebook) during work hours. However, though these devices exist,
the predicted demand of commitment seems to far outstrip the much more limited supply.
Existing literature gives one reason for this dearth: a lack of sophistication (DellaVigna
and Malmendier (2006)) on the part of DMs. On the other hand, others have argued that
combined with learning, an initial a lack of sophistication can only lead to overcommitment
in the long run (Ali (2011)). The results in this paper show (as others, e.g. Bryan et al.
(2010), have informally stated) that there may be many other good reasons for individuals
not to want binding commitments or sticks even when they know that they will be faced
with temptations. In addition, at least anecdotally, it seems that many individuals do use
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example, agreeing to go out to a nice meal with friends conditional on ﬁnishing a work
project) so actually these types of commitments may be quite prevalent and understudied.
Many interesting issues remain in the study of self-control – especially in the domain
of dealing with self-control problems. This paper is meant to be a ﬁrst step in applying the
existing economic theories to both the understanding how individuals deal with self-control
problems and the task of designing useful mechanisms that individuals could use to stick
to their long-run optimal plans.Chapter 4: How to Commit (If You Must) 113
4.6 Appendix 1: Strictly Optimal Sticks
Suppose that we consider a world where the DM is restricted to trembling to the action
T with probability : Assume that this tremble incurs no self-control cost (the next section
of the appendix discusses in more technical detail why we use this formulation instead of a
formulation where the control cost is allowed to depend on the tremble probability) so that
a DM who trembles to T receives ﬁnal LR utility b   k   1: Let
W(
(k);k) = (1   )W(
(k);k) + (b   k   1):
This lets us deﬁne a stronger notion of optimality for stick contracts.
Deﬁnition 4. Say that k is a strongly optimal KM contract if for any k0 2 R+ n k there
exists a sequence n ! 0 such that
Wn(
(k);k) > Wn(
(k
0);k) for each n 2 N:
Let K be the set of strongly optimal KM contracts.
The logic behind this deﬁnition is a sort of puriﬁcation argument similar to that em-
ployed in many game-theoretic reﬁnements. The next proposition shows that the deﬁnition
has bite as a reﬁnement of the optimal stick set:
Proposition 10. For an FL DM with  < 1 we have that K is a single point given by
k
 =
b   
e t0 :Chapter 4: How to Commit (If You Must) 114
4.7 Appendix 2: Mixed Strategies
WemaywanttomodelnotexogenouslyspeciﬁedtremblesbutconsiderDMswhomake
choices that are not simply single elements of some choice set but probability distributions
over the choice set. To analyze such choices, we need to make assumptions on how the
choiceofprobabilisticactionsinﬂuencestheself-controlcostsoftheLRself. Inthissection
we will relax the linearity assumption made in the body of the paper and let   be a general
weakly convex, smooth function with  (0) = 0:
For notation, let M(A) be the set of probability distributions over a ﬁnite set of alter-
natives A  X with generic element : Let (y) be the probability that  assigns to y 2 A:
There are two main ways to consider:
Deﬁnition 5. Fix  2 M(A); the ex-ante expected self-control cost denoted (;A) of 
is given by
(;A) =  (uSR(A)  
X
y2A
(y)USR(y)):
The intuition behind this formulation is that the LR self actually chooses a probability
distribution over elements of A, pays the self control cost for the distribution and then
realizes some draw from the distribution. The other formulation is as follows:
Deﬁnition 6. Fix  2 M(A); the ex-post expected self-control cost denoted (;A) of 
is given by
(;A) =
X
y2A
(y) (uSR(A)   USR(y))
In this formulation the randomization is viewed as one over the LR self’s control ac-
tions. Here the LR self uses the randomizing device to select an action but pays self-control
costs to execute it as in the standard deﬁnition.
For simplicity we now assume that we have for all A  X and y 6= y0 2 A
ULR(y)    (uSR(A)   USR(y)) 6= ULR(y
0)    (uSR(A)   USR(y
0))
so the LR self is never indifferent between any two options when self-control costs are
taken into account. Then ﬁx A  X and let 
 be the solution to
max
2M(A)
X
x2A
(x)ULR(x)   (;A)Chapter 4: How to Commit (If You Must) 115
and 
 be the solution to the same problem using the ex-ante self-control formulation.
The choice of formulation is not without consequences:
Proposition 11. For any A  X we have that 
(x) 2 f0;1g for any x 2 A:
Proof. Recall that the LR utility of choosing mixed strategy  is given by
X
y2A
(y)ULR  
X
y2A
(y) (USR(x
(A))   USR(y)):
But this is just
X
y2A
((y)ULR   (y) (USR(x
(A))   USR(y))):
By assumption of no indifference there exists a unique y 2 A to maximize this.
Thus under the ex-post formulation a DM who is not constrained to choose a distri-
bution with full support always makes a deterministic choice. This is not the case for the
ex-ante formulation. Consider an example where utility is linear and the choice set A is
given by the consumption streams x = (1;0) and y = (0;2): Suppose further that  = 0;
 = 1 and  (z) = az2: The LR utility of choosing a distribution  2 M(A) is given by
X
x2A
(x)ULR(x)   (;A)
that in this case is
2((y)) + (1   (y))   a(1   (1   (y)))
2:
It can be readily checked that the optimal solution sets
(y) =
3
2a
for values of a > 3
2 and thus is interior. However, this effect is a result of the choice of
self-control cost function:
Proposition 12. If   is a linear function then
(x;A) = (x;A)
for any choice of A  X and x 2 A:
If we are not restricting   to be linear and since the choice of non-degenerate random-
izations in basic maximization problems seems to be intuitively unappealing so the ex-post
self-control formulation seems more reasonable.Chapter 4: How to Commit (If You Must) 116
4.8 Appendix 3: Proofs of Propositions
We ﬁrst prove an auxiliary lemma that makes the following results much simpler.
Lemma 1. The function W((k);k) is continuous in k:
Proof of Lemma 1. Fix k: If there exists a neighborhood N of k such that (k) = (k0)
for all k0 2 N then clearly W((k);k) is continuous at k:
To look at the kink points of W ﬁrst notice the following basic property: W(T;k) is
decreasing in k and W(R;k) is weakly increasing and both are continuous. Therefore,
there exists k such that (k) = T for all k < k and (k) = R for all k  k: But at k
we have that W(T;k) = W(R;k) so W((k);k) is continuous at k also.
Proof of Proposition 4. The fact that KR is non-empty is obvious (just consider arbitrarily
large k).
For the second part of the proposition, suppose the DM has  = 0 then SC(R;k) =
 (b) = SC(R;k0) for all k;k0 2 R+: This means that W(R;k) = W(R;k0) < W(T;0)
for all k;k0 2 R+: But since W(T;k) is decreasing in k it is the case that for any k > 0 we
have that
maxfW(T;k);W(R;k)g < W(T;0):
Thus K = f0g:
Proof of Proposition 5. To show this look at the utility of choosing R with stick contract
of size k; this is simply
  (b   e
    e
 t0
k)
if T is preferred to R by the SR self and 0 otherwise. k thus sets SC(R;k) = 0 which is
exactly when
e
 t0
k = b   e
 :
Algebra gives:
k
 =
(b   e )
e t0 :
Corollary 1 follows from this argument as well. Note that the fraction has a denominator
less than 1 which shrinks exponentially in t0, thus k grows exponentially in t0 and this
shows Corollary 3.Chapter 4: How to Commit (If You Must) 117
Proof of Corollary 2. Fix a DM by the argument in the proof of Proposition 1 there exists
a k such that k  k implements resisting. By the indifference argument from the proof of
Proposition 1 it must be that
W(0;P) > W(k;I) = W(k;P)
however by continuity it must be that for a small neighborhood (k;k) it is the case that
W(0;P) > W(k
0;P) 8 k
0 2 (k;k):
Buteachk0 isalsoanelementofKR byconstruction, thuswehaveprovedthecorollary.
Proof of Proposition 6. Note that for any r implemented at t0 > 1 does not affect the pref-
erences of the perfectly myopic SR self. By the way the carrot is ﬁnanced, the LR self is
also completely indifferent between the case where r is given at t0 and lifetime consump-
tion changes to ﬁnance the carrot or whether the carrot is not activated. In this case, no
carrot can affect decisions.
Proof of Proposition 7. To show this proposition, call the utility of the SR self from taking
action x under a carrot of size r to be uSR(x;r): Then
uSR(T;r) = b   e
 
while
uSR(R;r) = e
 t0
r:
This means that the self-control cost of R can be written as
 (b   e
    e
 t0
r)
while uSR(T;r) > uSR(R;r) and 0 afterwards. This cost decreases continuously to 0 in r
so that means there must exist an r such that for r > r the
b   1 >   (b   e
    e
 t0
r)
so the LR self chooses R: Thus
R
R = fr 2 R j r  rg:Chapter 4: How to Commit (If You Must) 118
This also means that we can take
r
 =
b   e 
e t0
and we have that r  r means the SR self weakly prefers R to T and thus that self-control
costs are 0 and the DM chooses R: From this argument, combined with the one proving
Proposition 6 we have that Corollary 4 is obvious. From the expression we can also see
that Corollary 5 holds.
Proof of Proposition 8. We can now consider the case of accepting a stick of size k. The
SR self’s utility of choosing k at time 0 is given by uSR(k;t = 0) = 0 because the SR
self correctly anticipates that R will be taken at time t = 1: Notice that this means that the
SR’s utility of choosing N at t = 0 is given by
uSR(N;t = 0) = e
 (1   e
 )
which is greater than 0: Thus the self control cost from taking k from any menu that
includes N is strictly positive. Note that an identical analysis applies to choosing a binding
commitment when the option for no commitment is present.
Now consider the case of taking r at t = 0: Under a carrot of r the SR self is exactly
indifferent between choosing R and T at t = 1: This means that
uSR(c
;t = 0) = e
 (1   e
 ) = uSR(N;t = 0):
Thus the self control cost of implementing r at t = 0 is zero and so the DM strictly prefers
carrots to sticks and binding commitments
Now, suppose that the agent gets a revision opportunity at some time t 2 (0;1): If faced
with a carrot, he has no incentive to revise. If faced with a stick or binding commitment,
choosing N now carries an SR utility of
uSR(N;t = t) = e
 (1 t)(1   e
 ) > uSR(N;t = 0)
and thus a self control cost of  (uSR(N;t = t)):
The ex-ante expected utility of taking a binding commitment or k at t = 0 given
a Poisson arrival rate  is continuously decreasing in  and bounded above by  (1 +Chapter 4: How to Commit (If You Must) 119
) (uSR(N;t = 0)) which decreases without bound. Thus there exists an  such that
for  >  the DM prefers, at t = 0 to have no commitment than either k or a binding
commitment. Note that because there is no temptation to revise a carrot, the expected
welfare of a DM with a carrot contract is constant in :
Proof of Proposition 9. Suppose that we set k >
bmax
e t0 then for any realization of b the
SR self prefers R to T so a stick can simulate binding commitment (thus the DM is at
least indifferent to binding commitments). Now we show that this preference can be strict.
Suppose that b can either be b < bL < 1 with probability p or bH > 1 with probability
1   p: Thus the ex-ante expected utility of being uncommitted
p(bL   1) + (1   p)(bH   1):
Now, suppose we take
k =
bL   e 
e t0 :
This means that at bL the SR self is indifferent between R and T: The expected utility of
taking k is then given by
p(0) + (1   p)(bH   k   1):
Note that if bH is very high then the DM is better off in this contract then under a binding
commitment which delivers an expected utility of 0: Note also that given this problem we
can set p to be close to 1 (in which case the ordering is stick  binding  no commitment)
or close to 0 in which case the order is stick  no commitment  binding.
Suppose now that we set r =
1   e 
e t0 : This means that for all b  1 the SR self prefers
R to T: However, for all b > 1 the SR still prefers T to R so now LR and SR preferences
are aligned in all cases. This means for any b the DM exerts no self-control and takes
the choice that is LR optimal. Thus, carrots make the DM better off than either sticks or
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4.9 Appendix 4: Costs of Carrot Contracts
Inthemaintext, carrotswerefundedbymovingfutureconsumptionfromfutureperiods
to time t0: We made the assumption that carrots were costless to make the comparison to
costless sticks and binding commitments easier. We now discuss what the true cost of
a carrot contract is: we will do this by bounding a DM’s utility loss from perturbing a
consumption stream in a particular way. We then calibrate this loss making an assumption
of log utility and show that these intertemporal losses are quite reasonable and so even
factoring this cost carrots remain a useful tool for DMs seeking commitment.
We look at the effects of taking a carrot on the welfare of the LR self. To do this, we
simply consider a normal DM who lives in discrete time, discounts with rate  and has a
smooth, concave utility function u and has a ﬂat consumption path (c;c;c;c;:::) until the
end of time. Now, suppose that this DM is to move B units of consumption from the future
into period t = 1: He does this in the following way: from each period t = 2 to 2 + N he
borrowers B
N units of consumption.
We now ask, what is the loss from t = 2 on from implementing this consumption path.
This is exactly
t+N+1 X
t=2

t 1(u(c)   u(c  
B
N
)):
However, note that for a very patient DM and large N this loss can be well approximated
by
Bu
0(c):
Formally, the following is true:
Proposition 13. For any  > 0 there exists  < 1 and N such that
j
t+N+1 X
t=2

t 1(u(c)   u(c  
B
N
))   Bu
0(c)j < :
Proof. To show this note that we can use the fact that marginal utility is decreasing to
bound this loss by
t+N+1 X
t=2

t 1B
N
u
0(c  
B
N
):Chapter 4: How to Commit (If You Must) 121
This is because for each unit of consumption he loses, the DM loses at most u0(c  B
N) units
of utility.
Now we can take N to be very large, and thus this is well approximated by
t+N+1 X
t=2

t 1B
N
u
0(c):
Now we can also take  to be very close to 1 in which case this is now well approximated
by
N
B
N
u
0(c)
which is exactly the result we want.
Now, Bu0(c) is an upper bound for the loss of a very patient LR self from t = 2 and
on. There is an extra portion to be considered which is the fact that the DM gets to eat
these B units at time t = 1: At t = 1 his gain is bounded below by Bu0(c + B); again due
to concavity. This means the total loss from the B perturbation of the DM’s consumption
stream is bounded above by
B(u
0(c)   u
0(c + B)):
We now consider whether this loss is relatively big or relatively small. To do this, we
make a functional form assumption on the DM: we say that he has log utility. We also
parametrize the size of B in terms of his daily consumption c so B = rc: For log utility,
the LR loss in utils of the intertemporal disturbance is given by
rc(
1
c
 
1
(1 + r)c
):
The expression above simpliﬁes to
rc(
rc
c2(1 + r)
)
which further simpliﬁes to
r2
1 + r
:
Now we can consider the relative cost of the intertemporal move B: Suppose that daily
consumption c is $100 per day, and that B is one day’s consumption (a very nice dinnerChapter 4: How to Commit (If You Must) 122
compete with apertifs, paired wine and a delicious desert). This means that r = 1 and so
the loss in utils of the move B is 1
2: Note that daily utility is log(100)  4:6 so the shadow
cost (in utils) of a carrot of the same size as a full day’s consumption is approximately
10% of a day’s consumption in this case. The table below shows shadow intertemporal
costs in terms of the utility of a day’s consumption for various levels of B and c under
the assumption of log utility. Note again that this is an upper bound on losses which may
not always particularly tight because for extremely large values of B relative to c as our
approximation of the gain at t = 1 will be off by quite a bit. However, for the values of c
and B considered in the table the bound is relatively tight.
B = $50 B = $100 B = $200 B = $400
c = $50 12% 34% 81% 181%
c = $100 3:6% 10% 29% 69%
c = $200 :9% 3:14% 9:4% 25%
c = $400 :2% :8% 2:7% 8:3%
Figure 4.3: Upper bound on shadow cost of a carrot of size B by levels of daily consump-
tion as percentage of 1 day’s consumption utility.
Thus, reasonably sized carrots (relative to daily consumption) are not that expensive to
implement.Chapter 5
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